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ABSTRACT
THE CARROT VS. THE STICK: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SECONDARY
SANCTIONS VS. POSITIVE INDUCEMENTS IN GAINING EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR A
U.S.-LED SANCTION REGIME
Andy Gomez
Old Dominion University, 2022
Director: Dr. Richard Maass

The United States has a history of imposing its will on other countries via aggressive
sanction regimes. In many of those regimes, U.S. policymakers note that support from European
partner states is paramount to the regime's success. Over the past 20 years, the U.S. and its
European partner state's interests have had relatively aligned, fostering cooperation and
implementation of like-minded policies against target states. The end of paralleled interests left
policymakers with a conundrum, which stemmed the research question of this study. What
circumstances determine whether secondary sanctions or positive inducements are more effective
in gaining European support for a U.S.-led sanctions regime? Utilizing Mill’s method of
agreement (Mill 1869) and implementing the structured focused comparison case study approach
(George and Bennett 2005) this study evaluates two cases in which European actors are being
sought out to support a U.S.-led sanction regime. Both cases evaluated differ in various ways,
however, contain two critical similarities, the U.S. need for partners state support and the
unwillingness of the partner state to comply with the sanction’s regime. Through the
comparative framework outlined this study argues that specific conditions can facilitate higher
efficacy secondary sanctions over positive inducements, and vice versa, even when the partner
state does not desire to comply with the overall sanction’s regime.
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INTRODUCTION
The use of sanctions, by the U.S., to impose its will upon states is not a new topic. The
U.S. has been a part of sanction regimes for nearly a century. “During World War I, Congress
passed the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) that not only prevented trade with Germany but
also authorized the seizure of German property in the United States.” (Alexander 2009, np).
Although a dated tactic, recent political events have placed sanctions at the forefront of U.S.
foreign policy tools. The dominance of the U.S. market, its international leadership roles, and its
global power position provide substantial economic capability the U.S. can use to affect the
calculus of other states. Although compelling, scholars realize that the track record the U.S.
boasts from unilateral sanctions is not great. Policymakers recognize this as well, and as such,
have sought continuous support from their European partners to achieve its desired goals. The
pursuit of aid from European partner states has been received in a mixed way over the past 20
years. When the interests of both parties are in tandem the partner states comply with the U.S.
sanctions toward a target state and have even been known to impose more stringent sanctions in
addition. “After 2005, the nuclear controversy surpassed all strategic issues—energy, Middle
East security, trade and even human rights—in EU-Iran relations. As a result, the EU policy
increasingly resembled U.S. policy on Iran.” (Posch 2010, 1). When interests have diverged the
rhetoric shifts substantially. This is exemplified by the relationship between the world and the
U.S. as President Trump laid his America first agenda and began to upset the balance of the U.S.
on the international stage. “The question of US-EU relations has become all the more pressing
since the 2016 election of U.S. President Donald Trump. Trump has already challenged some of
the core principles underlying transatlantic relations since the Second World War, including the
US defense guarantee, open trade relations and the support for multilateral institutions and
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agreements such as the Paris accord on climate change and the Iran nuclear accord.” (Riddervold
and Newsome 2018, 505). “Trump’s retreat from the Paris climate deal, the Intermediate- Range
Nuclear Forces treaty, the Open Skies agreement, and the World Health Organization (WHO) as
well as his attacks against the WTO appellate body have rocked many Europeans’ belief that
they share common ground with their most important ally.” (Blockmans 2021,5). These adverse
actions coupled with President Trump's verbal dissent toward the EU put their relationship with
the U.S. at a point of turmoil and dysfunctionality.
This provides a window from which this case seeks to provide a contribution. Through
the research question, what circumstances determine whether secondary sanctions or positive
inducements are more effective in gaining European support for a U.S.-led sanctions regime?
Utilizing Mill’s method of agreement (Mill 1869) and implementing the structured focused
comparison case study approach (George and Bennett 2005) this study evaluates two cases in
which European actors are being sought out to support a U.S.-led sanction regime. Within the
two cases, one involving Iran and the other Russia, I will analyze the causal mechanics that
influenced the efficacy of secondary sanctions or positive inducements. Within these analyses
due regard will be given to the considerations of both the sender state and the European partner
state as to allow for a mapping of decision-making processes. The paramount importance of
firms and their calculus is also a keynote of this study. Firms are vital to partner state economies
and as such can act as the catalyst for gaining support. To demonstrate these occurrences, a
framework of five standardized questions has been implemented and provides the comparative
power necessary for this study to draw conclusions of not only scholarship, but also utility to
policymakers. This thesis will evaluate each case highlighting specific circumstances and
conditions that can provide policymakers cues and insights from which to make policy decisions
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regarding European partner state support. Following the singular analysis, I compare both cases
side by side and draw conclusions based upon the hypotheses of this study. From this evaluation,
I find that the presence of four specific conditions in a case can aid policymakers in their
decision-making as to which tool, secondary sanctions, or positive inducements, would gain
them the desired support for the overall sanction regime. The four conditions are a product of the
synthesis of both cases via the framework and as such yield two substantial insights. Primarily,
the application of the framework can help policymakers in their quest to increase their efficacy at
gaining European partner support, and secondarily it provides a branch from which future
research can use to refine and expand its applicability.
This thesis begins with a chapter discussing the relationship between the U.S. and the
European Union, its historical significance, and some legislation that is pertinent to this study.
The following chapter reviews notable literature involving sanctions efficacy, multilateral
sanction regimes, secondary sanctions, positive inducements, and sanctions against allies. This
sets the stage for the methodology chapter that will outline the variables, hypothesis, limitations
of this study, and the standardized questions to be used as the guiding framework of this study.
The methodology is followed by two case studies, the first on the U.S. and Iran regarding the
unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA and the second of the U.S. and Russia regarding the
Russian energy coercion and pipelines. The final chapter is a conclusion that utilizes the five
standardized questions to conduct a comparative analysis of both cases and draw conclusions
from which stemmed the four conditions that serve as this study's findings.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Sanction regimes are a highly researched topic, even so, there are still many unanswered
questions. Research into sanction regimes is split between those who believe they are ineffective
(the majority) and those who believe that they are effective. There is also the question of
unilateral vs multilateral and which type of regime is more effective which has been addressed
by various scholars. (Martin, 1994; Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999; Miers and Morgan, 2002;
Bapat and Morgan, 2009; Bapat et. al. 2013). If multilateral sanction regimes illicit a different
efficacy than that of unilateral sanction regimes, then a logical question to follow would be; how
does a country go about gaining that multilateral support for a sanction regime? This question
facilitates an opening for a contribution that this study will fill by way of secondary sanctions
and positive inducements. Secondary sanctions and positive inducements alike, have been an
instrumental part of foreign policy and diplomacy for decades and yet are not addressed in the
sanctions debate literature as they should be. Gaining support for a sanction regime is something
more than determining if a regime succeeds or fails, it has an inherent context of diplomacy and
a strategic aspect as well. It also contributes to the efficacy debate inherently as it can sway the
success or failure of a sanction regime. Inclusion of this into sanction debate literature will
inherently provide policymakers with a reference point of which to start when seeking support
for a sanction regime.
For this study, the secondary sanctions and positive inducements serve as two sides of the
same coin as tools used by the U.S. to gain support for their sanction regimes. In order to
understand the importance of these tools’ literature on the sanctions debate, and both tools will
be highlighted. This literature will highlight variables and circumstances that scholars debate
determines the efficacy of sanctions regimes and as such will be used to complement the
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forthcoming case study analyses. With the U.S. as a main proprietor of sanctions throughout the
globe, an analysis of U.S. involvement in multilateral sanction regimes is vital to establishing a
baseline knowledge from which to expand through a methodological analysis that follows. A
final aspect of literature that is necessary for a composite understanding of this study is that of
European sanction support. The interdependence of the U.S. and European actors is an
unquestionable relationship. This being such, European actors still interact with other parts of the
world that the U.S. may consider less favorable. Literature regarding their positionality on
sanctions in general and how they have interacted with U.S. sanction regimes in the past will
illuminate the contribution window that the case studies will contribute to. The circumstances
that affect the efficacy of secondary sanctions and positive inducements in gaining European
support can be seen to sample from the various literature disciplines to be explored below.
THE SANCTIONS EFFICACY DEBATE
The sanctions debate has a clear dividing line, that line is not in the middle but severely
skewed to one side. Throughout the volumes of literature written on sanctions, many of them
begin with an argument against the efficacy of sanctions. “The number of sanction episodes
seems to be on the rise and sanctions have increasingly gained in popularity in recent years and
such despite the fact that the literature does not present conclusive evidence that economic
sanctions are an effective policy instrument.” (Smeets 2018, 2). Even earlier than 2018, it was
already considered conventional wisdom that sanctions efficacy was lacking. "The conventional
wisdom of twenty years ago held that economic sanctions are not effective policy instruments."
(Bapat et. al. 2013, 3). Assessments of unilateral U.S. economic sanctions grew substantially in
the 1990s and “The consensus finding of these studies is that economic sanctions are not an
effective tool of foreign policy.” (Askari et.al 2003, 1). “Economic sanctions are likely to be
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imposed when they are not likely to succeed in changing the target’s behavior. Sanctions that are
likely to succeed will do so at the mere threat of sanctions. Despite the unlikely success of
sanctions, coercers must sometimes impose sanctions, even after the threat of sanctions has
failed to change the target’s behavior.” (Lacy and Niou 2004, 25). This poses a general
questioning of both the premise of sanctions and their continued use and a more important
literary gap in covering how or what can be done to make sanctions more effective? Scholarly
databases have quantified sanction regimes and their efficacy that lend more fuel to the argument
of inefficacy. “The widely used Peterson Institute for International Economics sanctions
database, which covers almost 200 cases, shows that sanctions fail to achieve their policy goals
in about two out of three cases. The more recent research of the Targeted Sanctions Consortium
(TSC) on United Nations (UN) targeted sanctions suggests an even lower rate of success: on
average, in less than one in four instances.” (Biersteker and Van Bergeijk 2015, 17). With an
overpowering negative connotation, the debate from the majority side has left scholars with an
overarching question as to why are sanctions used so frequently if literature is continually
demonstrating that they are ineffective?
This question is answered by those who do believe in sanction regime efficacy but deem
it is difficult to quantify based on the dynamics inherent to sanctions. A notable contribution to
this argument regards nuclear proliferation and was authored by Nicholas Miller. In his article
The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions, 2014 Miller explains his view of the debate
arguing “That economic and political sanctions are indeed a successful nonproliferation tool, but
that selection effects have rendered this success largely hidden.” (Miller 2014, 914). Miller
builds on realist literature on sanctions and goes forward to describe that selection effects may
dissuade a country from pursuing a nuclear option before its inception if they feel they are
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susceptible to the sanctions that would follow, making the sanctions regime successful but
difficult to quantify. Although this is a nuclear example it is comparable to substantial literature
regarding the difficulties of selection effects and what they take away from quantifying sanctions
efficacy. “The difficulty of observing threats that never need to be executed, particularly threats
made behind closed doors, raises the possibility that selection bias has seriously affected
empirical studies of economic statecraft” (Drezner 2003, 644). “Recent theoretical developments
have attributed the lack of agreement in the empirical findings to a selection bias, stemming from
looking only at cases of imposed sanctions. Many recent theories suggest that threats are an
important part of sanctions episodes.” (Bapat et. al. 2013, 4). These positions on defending
sanctions efficacy are pertinent but non-conclusive leaving both sides in a stalemate of efficacy
contributions.
With the general sanction's efficacy debate discussed above, it is imperative to illuminate
literature on two substantial aspects of this study. The first being multilateral sanctions regimes
and the second being literature that discusses implications and efficacy of sanction regimes
implemented on allies or partners. Depending on the purpose of sanctions unilateral or
multilateral may both achieve the desired goal. For this study, the goals to be discussed are
economic in nature. Unilateral sanctions have been utilized for this end by the U.S. and other
actors throughout history providing for a sound literary comparison between unilateral and
multilateral sanctions. Literature on the topic of economic sanctions is that multilateral sanctions
are more effective. “Common sense suggests that an economic sanction imposed by only one
nation- even a powerful nation-will not be as effective as when many countries gang up to
impose their will on another country.” (Askari et. al. 2003,31).
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“According to the economics literature, the impact of a trade embargo on a target nation’s
welfare depends on the extent to which the embargo worsens the target’s terms of trade
with the rest of the world. The greater the share of trade affected by the embargo, the
greater will be the deterioration in the target’s terms of trade. Hence the presumption that
multilateral sanctions, in which a large number of trading partners or potential trading
partners join the sanctioning effort, will be more effective in inducing economic damage
than unilateral sanctions. In the case of multilateral sanctions, it becomes much more
costly for a target nation to find alternative markets or alternative sources of imports.”
(Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1999, 38).
This is met in contrast by sanctions literature that deems unilateral is more effective.
"Systematic empirical research consistently demonstrates the opposite pattern: unilateral
sanctions appear much more effective than do multilateral efforts.” (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot
1990; Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1999; Drezner 2000; Miers and Morgan 2002; Bapat and
Morgan 2009, 1075-1076). This puzzling dynamic has pushed scholars to reevaluate empirical
research under new lenses. A major milestone in this research comes from the utilization of a
more recent sanctions database allowing for the inclusion of more cases within the study of
multilateral economic sanctions efficacy. The use of the Threat and Imposition of Economic
Sanctions (TIES) database (Morgan, Bapat, and Krustev 2008) has allowed scholars to apply
more cases toward the debate and “lead to the conclusion that, if we examine a greater number of
cases over multiple dispute types, multilateral sanctions are indeed more effective than unilateral
sanctions.” (Bapat and Morgan 2009, 1076). This was proven through the use of the TIES
database which yielded results of "Multilateral sanctions were successful 55% of the time while
unilateral sanctions were successful 40% of the time.” (Morgan, Bapat, and Krustev 2008, 103).
There is criticism of these explanations under the thought that the participants in multilateral
sanction regimes matter for this efficacy point. “Perhaps the most important characteristic of
multilateral sanctions identified in previous research is whether an international institution was
involved in the forming of the coalition.” (Lektzian and Biglaiser 2013, 68). The implementation
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of multilateral sanctions by a global institution such as the United Nations has different results
than if any group of international actors banded together to implement their own. (Askari et. al.
2003,32). This is also an intuitive point that is defended by examples of multilateral sanction
regimes from OAPEC, The League of Nations, and the United Nations (Askari et. al. 2003). The
importance of this distinct factor in sanctions efficacy will be addressed further in both the U.S.led sanctions regime portion and the case studies to follow.
The ability for multilateral economic sanction regimes to increase the impact on a target
country is lucrative for states striving to ensure their goal is achieved. The literature on
multilateral sanctions explains the reasoning for this but is lacking in a discussion on the topic of
gaining support towards a multilateral sanction regime if it is not through an institution as noted
above. The reasoning for international actors to band together to implement a sanctions regime
are almost limitless. They can be mutual goals, economic benefits, or may even be due to the
threat of secondary sanctions forcing their hand into participation. The discussion of these causal
effects toward gaining support for non-institutional and institutional multilateral sanctions will
be a key contribution of this study.
When discussing sanctions, the topic lends itself towards coercion and a tool that would
not be immediately associated with use on allies or partners. Being that the U.S. is a major
democratic power and a majority of its allies and partners follow suit, it is fitting to utilize
democratic peace literature and other notable works to provide insight into where the
contribution of this study differs from past scholarly works. Democratic peace literature
acknowledges Immanuel Kant's theory that democracies do not go to war with each other and are
further compelled by empirical evidence that proves it to be so (Cox and Drury 2006; Mello
2014; Kant 1975). A study of 115 distinct cases of sanctions being implemented from 1978-
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2000 was used to the conclusion that most democracies are hesitant to sanction other
democracies (Cox and Drury 2006). The results of this study brought forth a vital point for this
study “The results further reveal that unlike other countries, the United States is not hesitant to
sanction its allies.” (Cox and Drury 2006, 710). The lack of hesitation from the U.S. does not
mean that considerations are not taken when utilizing sanctions against allies. Scholars who
study the topic have demonstrated that aftereffects are prominent in sanctioning allies. “To
compel their allies' participation, senders may have to employ unpopular coercive measures,
such as extraterritorial sanctions. As the US-imposed "Helms-Burton Act" demonstrated, these
policies can elicit extraordinary anger from allied governments and their constituencies—
breeding resentment and potentially creating intra-alliance rifts.” (Early 2012, 555). These rifts
are not subject to a purely causational relationship with sanctions imposed by an ally, but as will
be discussed, a multitude of other pertinent factors that necessitate a break from the literature to
explain the causation through the lens of not only sanctions on allies but the circumstances under
which they are more or less effective.
The debate acknowledged above considers a variety of variables to provide justifications
for defending one side or the other. Scholars have contributed a large selection of notable factors
apart from those discussed above that contribute to sanctions efficacy. “The principal factors that
determine the effectiveness of sanctions are when and how they are employed, to what end(s),
the specific political and economic characteristics of the target country, and the state of the
world.” (Askari et.al 2003, 67). Scholars propose that the success of sanction threats in extracting
policy concessions from a target state is subject to three mechanisms: (a) the potential economic
cost of a sanction to the target, (b) the target’s uncertainty about the resolve of the sender to
impose the sanction, and (c) the domestic audience cost faced by the sender for backing down on
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a threat.” (Drezner 2003; Lacy and Niou 2004; Whang, Mclean, and Kubersk 2013; Walentek
et.al. 2021, 419). Expectations, credibility, strategic interaction, and relative power advantages
are also notable factors that contribute heavily to sanctions efficacy. (Biersteker and Van
Bergeijk 2015, 22; Onder 2021, 40). Some who defend the effectiveness of sanctions discuss
that the study of them should be based on the targeted goals and not whether a regime failed. “By
differentiating the effectiveness of sanctions according to their purpose, the research of the TSC
has shown that sanctions intended to constrain or to signal targets are nearly three times as
effective (27% of the time) as sanctions intended to coerce a change in behaviour (only 10% of
the time).” (Biersteker and Van Bergeijk 2015, 19). For sake of brevity, the above-mentioned
positions on the sanction's efficacy debate comprise only a small portion of the vast literature on
the topic. Although the discussion is not all-encompassing it demonstrates a consistent avenue
for contribution through the premise of this study.
U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN MULTILATERAL SANCTION REGIMES
Scholars accept that the U.S. has a longstanding history of utilizing sanctions as a
foundation for various efforts on the global scale. Volumes of literature are written on some of
the most well-known U.S. sanction regimes toward Iran (Katzman 2010; Beall 2015), North
Korea (Lee and Choi 2009), and Russia (Nelson 2017). These efforts include but are not limited
to nuclear nonproliferation, anti-terror, and human rights. “The United States commonly deploys
unilateral economic sanctions against evil dictatorial regimes, fanatical terrorists, nuclear
weapons proliferators, and international narcotraffickers.” (Meyer 2008, 906). Accepted as they
may be literature has varying descriptions of the efficacy of U.S.-led sanction regimes. "Findings
indicate that U.S. unilateral economic sanctions are even less successful in coercing target
countries to modify their policies." (Askari et.al 2003, 1). “In the protracted sanctions regimes
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initiated by the United States against Cuba, Iran, and North Korea since the Cold War era, these
have not only diminished the possibility of cordial relations between the countries but have also
hindered their willingness to cooperate on other foreign policy issues.” (Peksen 2019, 285).
Moving forward from these determinations made by scholars a suitable next steppingstone is a
question of what about U.S. multilateral sanctions?
Stemming from literature demonstrating that multilateral sanctions are more effective
than unilateral ones, the question of U.S.-led multilateral sanction regimes requires discussion.
The topic of multilateral sanction regimes usually runs in tandem with thoughts of an
international institution such as the UN. The literature demonstrates however, most UN sanction
regimes began with a unilateral regime before. "The majority of UN sanctions are preceded by
unilateral or regional sanctions. Of the 23 cases of sanctions contained in the TSC data, 18 (78
percent) were preceded by national or regional sanctions.” (Brzoska 2015, 1341). This trend
demonstrates an aspect that international sanction regimes are causally a product of unilateral
regimes including those that were initiated by the U.S. This relationship provides an interesting
aspect of which contribution is necessary. The literature demonstrates that for the U.S., the
process of gaining support for a sanction regime is a priority. From 1990 through 1998, the U.S.
unilaterally imposed twelve sanctions but was a part of thirty-six multilateral sanction regimes
(Askari et.al. 2003, 32). This represents the peak of a period coined as “the decade of economic
sanctions” which demonstrates a continual increase in the ratio of U.S. multilateral vs. unilateral
sanction regimes (Askari et.al. 2003). The U.S. being a leading member of the UN, their
participation in UN sanction regimes only further contributes to the importance of multilateral
sanctions to the U.S. Scholars make a point to discuss that multilateral support can be cause for
an unsuccessful sanction regime. “Many unsuccessful cases, such as U.S. sanctions against Cuba
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or attempts to impose a grain embargo against the Soviet Union in 1980, are attributed to a
failure to gain international cooperation.” (Martin 1993, 408). Martin goes on to discuss that
multilateral sanctions usually occur under a type of asymmetry of interests between potential
sanctioners. (Martin 1993, 408). This asymmetry of interests has the potential to be influenced
by an almost limitless number of factors. As noted previously the debate on what makes
sanctions effective is controversial and therefore the factors that contribute to gaining
multilateral support fall into a similar situation.
With the literary basis that supports logic showing multilateral sanction regimes are a
goal; the door is opened for questions toward the achievement of that end. Keeping in line with
that reasoning, an area lacking in the literature demonstrates the shift toward multilateral
sanctions but what the literature does not provide is a substantial insight into causal factors that
affect gaining the support of other actors. As noted asymmetry of interests can be anything, but
this study seeks to determine how does the U.S. makes that asymmetry of interests favorable to
both themselves and the actor so that they can gain multilateral support. Literature discussing
domestic actors' support such as companies and organizations in the private sector provides
compelling arguments toward their importance in facilitating sanction cooperation (Lektzian and
Biglaiser 2013). This study departs from that literature and seeks to determine circumstances that
affect the U.S. ability to gain support for their sanction regimes from other international actors in
a specific and focused way. This specificity provided will contribute to the literature on U.S.
involvement in multilateral sanction regimes in a way that is more internationally focused and of
use to policymakers of the future.
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SECONDARY SANCTIONS LITERATURE
Secondary sanctions are not a new concept or tool used by states, they do not however
receive the measure of literature that they are warranted. In 1982 the U.S. utilized secondary
sanctions via the prohibition of U.S. companies from providing parts and services toward the
construction of a soviet led European pipeline while also and most controversially extended this
prohibition to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies (Meyer 2008, 927). The definition of
secondary sanctions is common among scholars with few variations. Meyer defines secondary
sanctions as “Economic restrictions designed to deter third-country actors from supporting a
primary target of unilateral sanctions.” (Meyer 2008, 906). One notable variation is the addition
of a synonymous term coined extraterritorial sanctions. “Secondary or extraterritorial sanctions
penalize third-country individuals and companies for dealing with sanctioned countries.” (Tirkey
2019, 1). Although sanctions range in a wide area of implementation their efficacy is a topic that
is highly debated among scholars. Most of this debate is on primary sanctions, but secondary
sanctions are not excluded. “Secondary sanctions have proved cringingly controversial and often
politically counterproductive. By impeding the business interests of major U.S. trading partners
that have not joined a U.S. sanctions effort, secondary sanctions can antagonize major trading
partners of the United States and undermine U.S. efforts to rally consensus for more effective
multilateral sanctions.” (Meyer 2008, 906). Even with this antagonization, secondary sanctions
have become a first-choice tactic of U.S. policymakers. This first choice tactic is overused
significantly. This is due to the dynamic way the U.S. implements Secondary sanctions as a
punitive measure on both ally and adversary alike. “US secondary sanctions have been heavily
criticized for their extraterritoriality and were once a source of serious tension between the USA
and its allies.” (Han 2018, 475). They seek to apply coercive pressure on any actor who does not
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act in accordance with the overarching goals of the regime. “Rather than enforcement through
civil or criminal penalties, secondary sanctions rely on the ability of the U.S. government to
leverage the dominance of the U.S. financial system to coerce foreign persons to forgo otherwise
legal transactions with sanctioned persons.” (Bartlett and Ophel 2021, np). These sanctions are
implemented to provide the necessary support for the sanction’s regime, cooperative or not, and
makes a causal analysis of circumstances toward that efficacy a needed contribution to the
literature.
The question that this study seeks to answer is not one of legality or controversy but one
of causation and efficacy. This question is not organically new in a general discussion of
secondary sanctions “Faced with a secondary sanction threat, under what conditions is the third
party willing to participate in a multilateral sanction campaign?” (Han 2018, 475). “The choice
between aiding the United States or the target of its economic sanctions forces third-party states
to prioritize between the diplomatic relationships they have with both countries.” (Early 2012,
548). As noted above the implications of these choices have varying effects depending on
whether the third party is an ally or adversary. Where this discussion seeks to break from
standing literature is the implementation of secondary sanctions on specific allies of which other
causal factors, to be discussed in the methodology section, have decisive input on their efficacy.
Current literature utilizes game-theoretic models to emphasize the relationship between the
sender state, the target state, and the third party, resulting in a determination of credibility as a
major causal factor determining the efficacy of secondary sanctions (Han 2018). Others have
made note of causal relationships between the sender state and the third party affected by
secondary sanctions on the topic of cooperation "When the costs of cooperating are low, sender
allies tend to be more supportive of its sanctions than other countries” (Early 2012, 568). This
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study takes this analysis one step further to discuss the relative power between the sender state,
and the target state with the third-party state with the goal of displaying how the relative power
relationship, cost to the third party, and third-party dependency on the target state can influence
credibility and ultimately efficacy of secondary sanction regimes.
POSITIVE INDUCEMENT LITERATURE
Positive inducements for international cooperation are a method used by many actors
who try to gain support for goals and endeavors in a non-coercive way. Bargaining literature
notes that the method of positive inducements is vastly understudied in international relations.
“Among the numerous sections of the International Studies Association, not one is explicitly
devoted to the issue of positive inducements in world politics. Although there are numerous data
sets on wars (e.g., the Correlates of War data set), military interventions (e.g., the data set
entitled “International Military Intervention, 1981–2005”), and economic sanctions, none are
devoted to positive incentives.” (Nincic 2010, 139). Those who do study it have an assortment of
methods that constitute positive inducements. The most obvious of which is monetary
contributions that take the form of economic and foreign aid contributions. Another category
inclusive of positive inducements is side payments. “Side-payments as an international
bargaining tactic refer to compensation granted by policymakers to other countries (foreign
policymakers or their state and societal constituencies) in exchange for concessions on other
issues.” (Friman 1993, 388).
Within side-payments is the tool of issue linkages which is utilized substantially in
contemporary literature and will serve as a prominent example of positive inducements in this
study. Scholars have coined various definitions for the term while also discussing its importance.
“Issue linkage—the simultaneous discussion of two or more issues for joint settlement—is
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considered a key instrument by which states secure agreement.” (Poast 2012, 278). “A case of
issue linkage occurs when one party in a dispute introduces a new issue into the dispute,
demanding that any resolution address all of the issues.” (Lacy and Niou 2004, 26). “Issuelinkage may be employed by powerful states seeking to use resources from one issue area to
affect the behavior of others elsewhere” (Axelrod and Keohane 2018, 239). Literature also
discusses that the efficacy and study of issue linkages application are lacking much like that of
positive inducements overall. “The truth is that, beyond some suggestive case studies and a few
indirect statistical tests, there exists no direct and systematic evidence that issue linkages actually
help states secure agreement” (Poast 2012, 278). Even so, literature provides tools to help
understand issue linkages by defining three main types; tactical, fragmented, and substantive.
Although issue linkages are associated withs sanctions in literature, for the purpose of this thesis,
Issue linkages are strictly viewed in instances of their application as a positive inducement. This
is to help draw a direct line of logic allowing for an uninfringed view of their contribution to
positive inducements in international relations. “Issue linkages create benefits for parties that
will otherwise find a treaty to be of little value or make clear to concerned parties that signatories
will remain committed to a final agreement.” (Poast 2012, 278). That occurrence is exemplified
via the application of positive inducements in the case study to follow. The pioneer of this
concept Ernst B. Haas, describes the rationale for the concept, “The objective is simply to obtain
additional bargaining leverage, to extract a quid pro quo not obtainable if the discussion remains
confined to a single issue.” (Haas 1980, 372). “If used to provide a positive inducement, linking
unrelated issues diminishes conflict during negotiations.” (Poast 2012, 281). Issue linkages prove
to be a vital aspect of positive inducements as they possess the ability for states to diversify their
negotiations toward a positive end for all parties involved. The ability to use issue linkages
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exclusively in a positive light increases the power of an actor to achieve the desired result, even
if it is less favorable for the subject state, by incentivizing their participation to a point where
relative gains are equal to or greater than those of non-participation.
EUROPEAN SANCTION SUPPORT
When introducing the topic of European sanction support, a brief discussion highlighting the
evolution of their relationship with the U.S. is necessary to provide context. The inception of the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 marks a point where U.S. and European relations
would begin to evolve into what exists in current times. Although not economic in nature, the
European actors realized that collective security was a necessity and through the North Atlantic
Treaty they were able to find such with the inclusion of the U.S. and Canada. “In this agreement,
the United States, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom agreed to consider attack against one
an attack against all, along with consultations about threats and defense matters.” (North Atlantic
Treaty Organization 2021). This would open the door for economic relations as the European
states would soon realize that they needed not only military cooperation but economic
cooperation as well.
On November 23rd, 1990, the U.S. and the EC both signed the Declaration on EC-U.S.
relations more commonly known as the Transatlantic Declaration (TAD) (EU Texts 2021).
Scholars note that this document was very much a “top-down document” however it provided a
long-term endowment of the U.S.- EC relationship and more importantly laid an institutional
framework for consultation between the two states (Henrikson 1995, 2). This declaration can be
viewed among the first formalized look of what goals and ideals brought the two actors together
and what they both strive for within their cooperation. The declaration reinforced the
commitment of both actors to NATO and its principles and then proceeded to lay out common
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goals that serve the interests of both parties. Amongst those goals were the support of
democracy, aid for developing countries, furthering of the multilateral trade system, and, most
notably for this study, "safeguard peace and promote international security, by cooperating with
other nations against aggression and coercion, by contributing to the settlement of conflicts in the
world and by reinforcing the role of the United Nations and other international organisations.”
(Transatlantic Declaration 1990). The goal to cooperate against coercion is a key takeaway from
this document as literature will show that the U.S. will not hesitate to utilize coercive tactics on
allies and that the European actors have legislation defending against said coercion.
Although the declaration provides a concrete document formalizing the new bilateral
relationship, it did not operationalize them, and therefore "It did not, in itself and by itself, do
very much.” (Henrikson 1995, 3). This created the necessity for further specifications about the
true intentions and agenda of this newly formed relationship. In 1995 the New Transatlantic
Agenda was established by the EU and the U.S. “The NTA set four major goals which are the
framework for U.S.-EU joint action: 1) promoting peace, development, and democracy around
the world; 2) responding to global challenges; 3) contributing to the expansion of world trade
and closer economic ties; and 4) building bridges across the Atlantic by encouraging closer
communication between people.” (New Transatlantic Agenda 1996, np).
The underlying connotation of early EU-U.S. relations laid a tone of cooperation and
commitment toward joint goals there was no shortage of disagreements and turmoil between the
two actors. In 1996 the U.S. passed the Helms-Burton Act that implemented secondary sanctions
and drove the EU toward resentment and action. Scholars note that the most controversial
portions of this act were Title III and Title IV. These two titles rely on the concept of trafficking
to grant them power. The act describes these occurrences of trafficking “The Cuban Government
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is offering foreign investors the opportunity to purchase an equity interest in, manage, or enter
into joint ventures using property and assets some of which were confiscated from United States
nationals.” (Congress.gov H.R. 927 1996, 792). “Title III penalizes such activity by creating a
right for U.S. nationals, whose claim to property confiscated by the Cuban Government has been
certified under Title V of the International Claims Settlement Act, to sue those engaged in
“trafficking” in U.S. federal courts.” (Davidson 1997, 1430). The act had an extremely broad
acceptance as to who is considered "engaged". The breadth of this definition was purposeful and
served to undermine international engagement with Cuba, however, it also created tension with
Europe in the same vein. “Title III provides that such proceedings may lead to judgments against
EU citizens to pay multiple compensation to a U.S. party” (Huber 1996, 701). The EU
immediately condemned these actions.
In fairness to the EU, its unrest was not specifically caused by what the act sought to do
with Cuba, but it was more than they realized they needed protection from third-party legislation
affecting them, in other words, they needed to nullify the legality of secondary sanctions. In an
effort to achieve this protection the EC came together to create “COUNCIL REGULATION
(EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial
application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting
therefrom” (Council Regulation 1996, 1). Amongst the most important parts of this legislation is
article four which “Article 4 prohibits, in categorical terms, the recognition and enforcement of
any judgment of a court as well as any decision of an administrative authority located outside of
the European Community giving effect to the Helms Burton Act or the D'Amato Act or to
actions based thereon or resulting therefrom.” (Huber 1996, 704). This served to directly
counteract article III of the Helms-Burton Act and nullify its enforceability. This would also
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undermine the legality of secondary sanctions on the international stage. This debate is still
relevant today as scholars now openly dissent U.S. secondary sanctions and continue to reinforce
the Council regulation.
The legality of secondary sanctions has shown to play a role in the past decisions of the
EU toward the U.S. and that trend continues. Rapidly following the U.S. unilateral withdrawal
from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran
Nuclear Deal, the EU updated the Council regulation to nullify the reimposed secondary
sanctions and allow for their firms to continue to do business with Iran. “On 8 May 2018, the
United States announced they will no longer waive their national restrictive measures relating to
Iran. Some of those measures have extra-territorial application and cause adverse effects on the
interests of the Union and the interests of natural and legal persons exercising rights under the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.”. (Commission Delegated Regulation (EU)
2018/1100 2018, 1). In its 2021 Communication “The European economic and financial system:
fostering openness, strength and resilience” of 19 January 2021, the Commission announced that
it would consider amending the blocking statute to further deter and counteract the unlawful
extra-territorial application of sanctions to EU operators by countries outside the EU.” (Blocking
Statute 2021, np).
European involvement in sanction regimes is a product of their prime position for global
involvement and a thriving European Union that conducts trade with the globe in its entirety.
They have played a key role in both implementing sanctions but also in contesting U.S.
sanctions. Within the European sphere, the EU can enact sanctions through the consensus of its
member states. This creates a unique position in which the EU is an international institution but
also has the characteristics of a state. Scholars have studied the EU and its sanctions
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implementation over history and have discerned that their policies vary based on geographic
location in proximity to Europe (Portela 2005, 85). Literature shows that there is a distinction of
“strands within EU sanctions usage:
“EU sanctions practice features two distinct strands: Firstly, the EU decides and
implements its own sanctions in the absence of a UN Security Council (UNSC) mandate.
This is referred to as the EU’s autonomous practice. The EU has reached consensus on a
number of sanctions regimes in the absence of pre-existing UNSC resolutions, thus
developing a rich autonomous sanctions practice that has become more frequent and
more sophisticated over the years. Secondly, it implements sanctions regimes decided on
by the UNSC, which are mandatory. Here, the EU acts in effect as an implementing
agency of the UNSC. The EU’s writ to implement UNSC sanctions is derived from the
duty that individual EU member states assume as members of the UN to comply with
Security Council resolutions and is justified on the basis of its responsibility to prevent
distortions in the common market as well as considerations linked to the efficacy of
implementation.” (Portela 2014, 1).
Within these two strands is the ability to choose to support or not to support any sanction regime
that is not within the UNSC mandates. This ability compiled with global European interaction
makes for a lucrative area to study the ability to gain support for sanction regimes. Though the
U.S. and the majority of Europe are partners, literature, as noted above, has emphasized that
enacting secondary sanctions on allies or partners does not dissuade the U.S. In the grand scheme
of sanctions literature primary regimes against allies is not likely however secondary sanctions
toward allies, including European actors, have been criticized and studied throughout the past
thirty years.
During the period of the late 1990s through the early 2000s, the potential effects of
secondary sanctions were not lost on the EU. The U.S. allies were rejecting their power to
enforce secondary sanctions. This coupled with the "passage of the Helms-Burton Act and the
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA), directed at the activities of non-U.S. companies in
third countries, has provoked a prolonged dispute with the European Union (EU) and with
several other U.S. allies and led to the making of a new European Community (EC) Regulation
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designed to protect European businesses from their effects.” (Davidson 1997, 1425). This
regulation was designed to protect the EU from secondary sanctions by any government enacting
the. The regulation reads “COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996
protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third
country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom” (Council Regulation 1996, 1). The
implementation emphasizes the perspective of the European actors and their dissent for U.S.
secondary sanctions. However, this does not mean that the sanctions were not effective. Recent
trade data from 2019 demonstrates that secondary sanctions implemented to stunt trade with Iran
were substantially effective at achieving their desired ends in Europe. “Following the reimposition of US sanctions, EU oil imports have quickly ground to a halt, with other non-EU
importing countries, such as China, India, Japan and South Korea also gradually reducing
exposure to Iran’s oil market.” (Alcaro and Desi 2019, 8). This occurrence brings forth a crucial
question of this study; what circumstances made these secondary sanctions work to gain the
support of European actors, amongst others. Literature has made it clear the dissent toward
secondary sanctions, yet it also illuminates a contradictory case of efficacy as well providing a
well-placed opening for contribution.
This study does not dismiss the effects of positive inducements on European participation
in sanctions regimes either. Scholars agree that the EU is not a military power by any traditional
definition (Nielson 2013) however their economic prowess is a measure they are willing and
capable to use. The EU's use of contractual negotiations, economic incentives, and less
aggressive development policies (Nielson 2013, 729) cement their familiarity with the concept of
positive inducements. Where this study departs from literature is to pose the question of the
efficacy of positive inducements that are utilized to gain European support. As a proprietor of
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positive inducements, literature discussing their use from the EU perspective does not provide
insight into their considerations when faced with the opportunity to receive said inducements.
These considerations are subject to influence by factors that this study seeks to directly evaluate
and discern the circumstances upon which they are effective and to what extent.
CONCLUSION
The voluminous debate on sanctions efficacy provides sound cause for continued
research into not only their efficacy but circumstances and tools that seek to affect it. It is
necessary through the review of the sanctions debate, to broaden the questions being asked when
considering how sanctions are studied and what constitutes effectiveness. All of the
aforementioned areas in literature coincide with the question of this study; What circumstances
determine whether secondary sanctions or positive inducements are more effective in gaining
European support for a U.S.-led sanctions regime? This study, spurring from the interdisciplinary
review of literature above, contributes an effective analysis and focused understanding of causal
factors, circumstances, and a new frame on variables that not only affect sanctions efficacy but
also how they are utilized as tools. The study to follow will utilize contributions from these
disciplines to further the sanctions debate while providing a policy-relevant tool of literature that
can be used for the future of foreign policy regarding sanction regime support.
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METHODOLOGY
To examine the distinct causal variables that contribute to the efficacy of secondary
sanctions and positive inducements in gaining European support for a U.S.-led sanctions regime,
this study will utilize Mill’s method of agreement (Mill 1869) implementing the structured
focused comparison case study approach (George and Bennett 2005) on two cases in which
European actors are being sought out to support a U.S.-led sanction regime. John Stuart Mill
was a renowned eighteenth-century English language philosopher who “sought to combine the
best of eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinking with newly emerging currents of nineteenthcentury Romantic and historical philosophy.” (Macleod 2020, np). Mill’s method of agreement
originates in one of his most notable works A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive:
Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific
Investigation. The method of agreement, in its simplest form, utilizes the comparison of two or
more cases in which most of the independent variables are non-consistent with each other and
yet the results of the case are similar, allowing for the determination of causation regarding
specific independent variables. Mill explains the occurrence as follows:
“Let A, then, be an agent or cause, and let the object of our inquiry be to ascertain what
are the effects of this cause. If we can either find, or produce, the agent A in such
varieties of circumstances, that the different cases have no circumstance in common
except A; then whatever effect we find to be produced in all our trials must, it would
seem, be the effect of A.” (Mill 1869, 222).
Mill's method provides the ability for comparison between the case studies to follow and in a
more specific note, allows for the isolation of variables that will provide evidence of thoughts,
actions, and occurrences in which secondary sanctions or positive inducements are
circumstantially more effective than one another. Although Mill's method addresses the
comparative nature and provides comparative power via literature, more structure is necessary to
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facilitate both the specificity and application necessary of this thesis. To add to the applicability
and merit of this study the structured focused comparison method pioneered by Alexander L.
George and Andrew Bennett in their 2005 book: Case Studies and Theory Development in the
Social Sciences will be utilized. This method provides a framework ensuring effective data
collection by asking a set of standardized yet general questions of each case to ensure the
acquisition of comparable data across all cases in a study (George and Bennett 2005, 69). This
method also outlines the need for the “Universe- that is the “class” or “subclass” of events- of
which a single case or group of cases to be studied are instances.” to be clearly defined (George
and Bennett 2005, 69). With this precedent, the methodology of this study will be discussed in
six parts. The first will be the case selection standards and justification of cases followed by the
second section covering specific terminology as it applies to this study. The third section will
explain the variables of this study and the fourth will cover the hypotheses. The fifth section
discusses comparative tools and metrics, in keeping with the framework outlined above. The
final section addresses notable limitations of the study.
CASE SELECTION STANDARDS AND CASE JUSTIFICATION
Case selection standards are a vital part of any theory or framework's applicability within
Academia. For this study and its framework, the “universe” of cases are cases that meet two
main criteria. First, the case must be an instance during which the U.S. has enacted a sanction
regime toward a target state that it wants its European partners to support. The entanglement of
the U.S. and Europe has been subject to almost every type of relationship that can be
demonstrated on the international stage. From adversaries, neutrals, and now in modern times
allies, the evolution of relations between both have become a crucial part of world history. This
relationship has grown ever stronger with globalization, alliances, the establishment of NATO,
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the UN, and an important institution for Europe, the EU. As history continues Europe has
ascended to one of the major hubs for trade in the world. Their premier institution, the EU,
accounts for 15.6% of the global imports and exports annually (The Economy 2020, np). For
reference in 2017, the U.S. accounted for 14% of the world’s exports and 18% of its imports
(The EU, USA and China 2017, np). The ability to shut off a target state from partners who
comprise nearly 30% of the global trade is a lucrative prospect to increase the efficacy of the
sanction’s regime.
Second, it must include the use of secondary sanctions or positive inducements toward
those European partners in an effort to gain compliance. These sanctions can be targeted at both
governments and partner state firms. For the applicability of this framework, secondary sanctions
targeted at partner state firms provide the most insight into the causal mechanics behind
compliance. This does not discount those targeted towards governments however, firms tend to
act autonomously from their governments when pursuing their best interests, and as such
sanctions on firms provide a more concrete causal path which is significantly less complex than
the immense pressure of politics and political actions. Positive inducements included in the cases
cover a wide range of possibilities. These include monetary contributions, omission of sanctions
toward specific actors, and other actions that are specifically for the benefit of the partner states.
One additional consideration that does not impact the universe of cases so much as the
process of selecting which case to study is that the cases must provide insight into the choices of
both the sender state and partner state regarding the utilization of secondary sanctions vs positive
inducements, the carrot vs the stick, to gain support for the U.S. ambitions. This means that
evidence of the inception thought processes and reactions of both the government actors and
firms must be available to analyze toward applying this framework. This study utilizes news
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articles, scholarly articles, government documents, partner state leader speeches, amongst other
forms of justification to validate these causal relationships. In line with these criteria two cases
were chosen that provide not only insight into the carrot vs the stick, but also differ substantially
allowing demonstration of the versatility that the framework of this study provides. The first case
delves into the U.S. departure from the JCPOA and reinstatement of sanctions and the second
explores the sanctions against the Russian-led Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream energy pipelines
in Europe.
The U.S. has sought European support for a sanction regime against Iran on a few
occasions, notably beginning around 2006 and leading to the JCPOA in 2014-15, and during
current events, post unilateral JCPOA departure in 2018 (Aslan 2018; Meagher 2020). The
history of their interrelationships on this very topic differs substantially from that of the modern
case. Nearing the end of the Bush administration but lasting through the majority of the Obama
administration, the buildup toward the JCPOA was one during which both the U.S. and EU
interests were nearly parallel to each other. Mutual goals of nonproliferation made gaining
European support easier, so easy that the EU over complied with the initial sanction regime and
allowed for a dynamic to form that provided secondary sanctions to flourish. “The EU imposed
new sanctions on Iran that went further than U.N. resolutions. The decision provided a
‘comprehensive and robust package of measures in the areas of trade, financial services, energy,
transport as well as additional designations for visa ban and asset freeze, in particular for Iranian
banks, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping
Lines (IRISL),’ according to a press statement.” (Posch 2010, 6). This compliance is significant
and demonstrates the foundations of secondary sanction efficacy in action. It would be unfair to
say that the compliance was unanimous, there were some advocates for noncompliance. "Despite

29
protestation from some of its member states (e.g., Belgium), the EU fell into line with U.S.
policy—essentially ratifying American use of secondary sanctions against a European banking
system that has never before ousted a nation from its network." (Meagher 2020, 1014).
This precedent of compliance has opened the door for this case study to demonstrate the
causal mechanisms that make secondary sanctions effective in gaining support for a sanction
regime. This case to be examined differs from those of the past through a crucial aspect, mutual
interests. In the past, as noted, the U.S. and the EU's interests aligned and thus fostered
compliance, complementing secondary sanctions and the participation of firms. That is not the
case in modern times. With the U.S. unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA and subsequent
reimposition of sanctions on Iran, the interests between the U.S. and the EU are quite the
opposite.
Russian natural gas pipelines provide another case suitable for this framework to analyze.
This is because the case regarding the Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream pipelines is prominent in
recent sanctions literature. Even so, a dive into this case shows that the sanctions imposed on the
pipelines are not what meets the eye. Some of the sanction discussions within these cases provide
evidence of positive inducements that the U.S. has provided its partners to achieve its goals.
Russia has continually had a distinct goal of lowering the amount of natural gas transiting
through Ukraine. To realize these goals Russia has taken advantage of its mass natural gas
repositories to build pipelines directly to both Germany and Turkey, essentially bypassing
Ukraine in the process. "Before Nord Stream 1 opened in 2011, about 80% of Russia’s natural
gas exports to Europe transited Ukraine. In 2019, about 45% of these exports transited Ukraine.”
(Belkin et.al. 2021, 1). With the completion of both pipelines these numbers will drop
considerably more. The U.S. perceives these actions as tactics that will cause their partner states
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to become majorly dependent on Russian energy exports and therefore it provides leverage
against them. This also provides openings for Russian exploitation of Ukraine which is another
area that is unfavorable to the U.S. Under this premise the U.S. utilized the Protecting Europe’s
Energy Security Act (Peesa), to implement sanctions against Russia. This also initiated
secondary sanctions on firms that had a part in the physical construction of the pipeline. This
plays an important role due to the firm Nord Stream 2 AG which was run by Russian energy
giants Gazprom but operated out of a Swiss-based enterprise. “In April 2017, Nord Stream 2 AG
signed the financing agreements for the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project with ENGIE, OMV,
Royal Dutch Shell, Uniper, and Wintershall. These five European energy companies will provide
long-term financing for 50 percent of the total cost of the project.” (“Nord Stream 2.” 2022, np)
The actions taken toward this firm by the U.S. represent a unique area for study. The U.S. elected
to exempt Nord Stream 2 AG from sanctions, even with proof of sanctionable activities, in
efforts to reinforce a distraught relationship with Germany. A State Department report sent to
Congress concluded that Nord Stream 2 AG and its CEO, Matthias Warnig, an ally of Russian
President Vladimir Putin, engaged in sanctionable activity.” (Shalal et. al. 2021, np). This
exemption paved the way for a pact between the U.S. in Germany that not only saw Germany
guarantee to abide by U.S. sanctions should the case arise, but also to enhance them with their
sanctions against Russia. The dynamics of this case provide value to demonstrate the dexterity of
this framework.
Both cases noted above are exceptional for this study for multiple reasons. First, they fall
in line with Mills' method of agreement in that both cases have different situations but end at the
same conclusion, the U.S. gains the support they desire. Secondly, both cases meet the three
criteria outlined for a case that will effectively utilize this framework for analysis. Thirdly, in
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both cases the partner state does not want to comply with the U.S. sanction regime. This allows
for the application of this framework toward an unusual occurrence and as such the can yield
results that can practically aid policymakers. And finally,, both cases differ in various areas
regarding the target state, political rhetoric, economic interactions, level of actor (Germany vs
the EU) and the implications of compliance vs noncompliance. Together these demonstrate the
versatility this framework provides.
TERMINOLOGY
Terminology is key in any project. The following section briefly aligns the terminology
to be utilized throughout the remainder of this study.
Partner: The term “partner” will exclusively be utilized to describe the European actors that the
U.S. seeks support from. This distinction is necessary to separate the target of the overall
sanction regime (Iran or Russia) from the target of the secondary sanctions and positive
inducements while also allowing for implementation across both case studies to follow without
confusion. These European "partners" include both the EU for the purposes of the Iran case study
and Germany who is the main proponent for the Russia case study.
U.S. Market: The term “U.S. Market” refers to the partner's market access from the U.S.
perspective. "Market access refers to the ability of a company or country to sell goods and
services across borders. Market access can be used to refer to domestic trade as well as
international trade, although the latter is the most common context.” (Kenton 2021). This term is
used to mean the access or lack of access to U.S. trade that can be amplified or inhibited by
positive inducements or secondary sanctions.
Target State: The term “target state” will be used to describe the target of the overall sanction’s
regime, for the purposes of the cases to follow this will be Russia or Iran.
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Firm: The term “firm” is utilized to describe any business entity that is affected by or subjected
to secondary sanctions or positive inducements. These include banks, large oil producers, and
multinational corporations that are a target by U.S. methods.
VARIABLES
Clearly defining the variables to be discussed, analyzed, and tested is a crucial step in any
project seeking to answer a question through research. This study is no different. To follow I will
outline my dependent variable and two independent variables.
DV: The efficacy of U.S. methods at gaining European partner support for their sanction
regimes.
The dependent variable for this study is the efficacy of U.S. methods at gaining European
partner support for their sanction regimes. Within the evaluation of the cases in this study, this
variable proves to be the product of the circumstances present within each case. Through
analyzing both cases and the variables to be discussed below the analysis provides criteria and
insight into what makes European partners support sanction regimes; more specifically, under
what circumstances do positive inducements or secondary sanctions work better to gain the
desired partner support?
IV1: Partner’s expected economic costs
The first independent variable is the partner’s expected economic costs. Coercion
literature indicates that recent studies show sanctions efficacy directly related to the expected
cost to the target state. "The success of threats of economic sanctions appears to be statistically
related to the target's expected cost of economic sanctions." (Walentek et.al. 2021, 420).
“Sanctions are more effective when the cost on the target is high, and the target’s ability access
markets for goods and services blocked by sanctions is low.” (Onder 2021, 39). This fits well
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with the topic of secondary sanctions as they are threats toward U.S. partners to gain support for
a sanctions regime directly targeted at another country. In essence, the partner country is the
target of the secondary sanctions.
Though this makes secondary sanctions a threat, a direct application of coercive methods
does not arrive at the most rational outcome. Implementing coercion literature would argue that
the higher the economic cost to the partner country the higher the efficacy of secondary
sanctions. This is true but it lacks perspective. The goal of secondary sanctions is to align
partners' interests with those of the U.S. via support. This brings forth the argument that the cost
of the secondary sanctions must be higher than the cost of complying with the U.S. desired
sanction regime for partners to comply. Negative reinforcement is not the only option on the
international stage. Positive inducements specifically issue linkages have been contributed to
multilateral sanctions efficacy in literature as well. A liberal institutionalist perspective
demonstrates that creating issue linkages creates a scope for mutually beneficial exchanges
(Keohane and Martin 1995, 41). These beneficial exchanges that Keohane and Martin discuss
require the understanding that both sides incur a cost. Intuitive as it may be, the sender state
would prefer to minimize the cost that they would incur when trying to gain the desired support.
This leads to logic that attempting to compensate the partner enough to outweigh or mitigate the
cost would force the sender state to consider if the cost they are incurring themselves is
beneficial to their overall goals. This brings forth an argument for the strategic use of positive
inducements in that if the cost is high for a partner state to abide by the sanction’s regime,
utilizing positive inducements to offset the cost can foster cooperation. It is important to
understand this variable is contingent upon any situation that is not a zero-sum game, as such
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neither case to be examined falls into this category and further explanation for this logic is
discussed in the limitations section to follow.
IV2: The impact of secondary sanctions or positive inducements targeted at Firms.
The second independent variable is the impact of secondary sanctions or positive
inducements targeted at firms. Firms play an important role as most secondary sanctions and
some positive inducements are not so much targeted at the state level but at the economic level
from which firms stand to gain or lose substantially. Firms directly impact a state's economy and
economic capability. As to be shown, even if a partner state does not want to abide by U.S.
requirements, private sector actors and the firms associated with them are much less accepting of
risk in general and even less so when losing access to the U.S. market is the potential
punishment.
Both cases to be examined reflect this and thus allow for the argument that the secondary
sanctions targeted at partner state firms are generally effective at ceasing actions undesirable to
U.S. interests. As noted previously the EU would pass a resolution condemning secondary
sanctions and attempting to protect its members from them, this however can be proved
unsuccessful via the case studies to follow that demonstrate the sanctions do have an effect via
firms’ actions within the partner states. The quantification of this efficacy will be shown via a
comparison of all firms subjected to both secondary sanctions and positive inducements. It will
demonstrate those who elected to comply as well as those who elected to disregard and through
this comparison and the causal discussion within the cases the importance of secondary sanctions
and positive inducements targeted at firms will be realized.
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HYPOTHESES
With the variables now justified for this study, a series of three hypotheses will seek to
operationalize these variables towards the determination of causal circumstances.
H1: The higher the economic cost to the partner the higher the probability that positive
inducements will convince partner states to support the sanction regime.
The first hypothesis of this study is the higher the economic cost incurred by the partner
state if they were to abide by the overall sanction regime, the higher the probability that positive
inducements will convince partner states to support that regime. Although this causal logic may
seem counterintuitive, it is justifiable. The premise is derived from an understanding that
European partner states place their goal of global validity above all else and as such, any risk
toward their access or participation with the U.S. open market is a threat to those goals. If the
cost of compliance is high, then simply increasing the cost with sanctions would not provide any
leverage or sway toward U.S. ideals. In other words, if the situation is a lose/lose for the partner
state, with a high cost on either side, the partner state will have no reason to choose to comply
with sanctions vice ignore them. Secondary sanctions inherently restrict or cut off access to the
U.S. open market. Therefore, if the cost is high, then if the U.S. instead offers inducements to
compensate for the high cost while also guaranteeing access to the U.S. market that is vital to
partner states, the probability of positive inducement effectiveness should increase. The literature
demonstrates that positive inducements, specifically issue linkages are a costly endeavor (Poast
2012). The willing incursion of the cost of negotiations, compiled with the positive inducement
provides not only a counterbalance to the cost but also credibility to the inducement. This comes
from the perspective that partner states consider the U.S. market invaluable and, as the cases to
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follow will show, are willing to make concessions to ensure access to it even when the cost on
the opposite side is high.
H2: The lower the cost to the partner state the higher the efficacy of secondary sanctions
to gain support via cooperation
Conversely, the second hypothesis is that the lower the economic cost incurred by the
partner state if they were to abide by the overall sanction regime, the higher the probability that
secondary sanctions will gain support for the regime from the European partners. The
implementation of secondary sanctions poses the partner state with a decision point. They must
choose between continuing the actions non-favorable to the U.S. at the cost of the U.S. market
coupled with various other hindrances on the international stage, or choose to abide by the
sanctions and instead bear a cost associated with the cessation of actions non-desirable to the
U.S. If the cost of cessation is low when compared to the cost of losing the U.S. market, then
partners are highly more likely to brunt said cost than attempt to risk the U.S. market access for
something of a low inconvenience. In other words, the less that the partner state stands to lose by
abiding by the sanction’s regime the more effective secondary sanctions become in gaining the
desired support from European partner states. This can be defended by literature previously
noted about the U.S. lack of hesitation to sanction allies and partners alike (Cox and Drury 2006)
and through the cases that demonstrate the comprehensive U.S. sanction regimes (Askari et.al
2003). With this logic in place, the partner state’s expected economic costs are an imperative
variable to consider when identifying the circumstances that lead to a partner’s support for a
sanctions regime.
H3: Secondary sanctions targeted at firms are more likely to yield concessions than those
directed at government entities.
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The third hypothesis of this study discusses the autonomy of partner state firms. Firms
are more likely to abide by secondary sanctions unilaterally regardless of the partner state action
because of their generally risk-averse posture. Specifically firms whose role is a catalyst for an
action unfavorable to the U.S can be subjected to sanctions specifically. These firms, particularly
energy, banking, infrastructure, and others whose access to the U.S. market is a top priority; are
especially vulnerable to U.S. secondary sanctions as they stand to lose substantially if the U.S.
market was closed off to them. Concessions yielded by a partner state to secondary sanctions are
at the mercy of politics and all complexity that entails. Secondary sanctions targeted at firms
become a threat to self-interest and as such illicit a reaction that serves the firms interests overall
without consideration otherwise. This justification leads logic that in an effort to protect its
economic stability and access to the U.S. market, firms will abide by secondary sanctions.
Through this causal logic, this hypothesis seeks to illuminate a specific aspect of
secondary sanctions that can further the calculus of U.S. policymakers and be a tool of
exploitation for the U.S. in the quest to gain partner support for a sanction regime.
COMPARATIVE TOOLS AND METRICS
Utilizing Mill's method of agreement requires that most variables differ while the
outcomes are similar. This is not a plausible demand via the scope of current international
relations, however within the two cases to be examined the outcome of U.S. sanction regime
support, willing or not, is achieved. The methods utilized to gain support however have both
similarities and differences making the case of the U.S. and European Union relationship with
Iran vs the Nord stream 2 and Turk stream pipelines with regards to Russia optimal to apply
Mill’s method towards. To prove these occurrences various data types will be utilized. Amongst
the most prominent of the data sources will be Eurostat data from 2020 (EU 27 2021), EU trade
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data from various years spanning the context of both case studies (Directorate General for Trade
2021, Top EU Trading 2019; European Commission 2021, European Commission 2021a). Also
notable will be GDP values from the world bank (Islamic Republic of Iran 2021, The World
Bank in Russia 2021). The quantifying sources compiled with both scholarly work, diplomat and
policymaker perspectives, and speeches and firm press releases will provide a comprehensive
display of both cases in keeping with Mill's method.
Keeping in line with the structured focused comparison method I have outlined five
generalized questions that will be imperative for extracting comparable data from both case
studies. These questions are not all-inclusive however will serve as vantage points from which
the cases can be compared.
Q1: What methods for gaining support for a sanction regime were utilized within the
case?
This question serves to baseline the comparison between any cases and provides an
upfront view of the U.S. methods to be discussed. This question is also vital for case selection
and ensures the focal points of both cases align to produce the ability to draw useful conclusions
regarding secondary sanctions and positive inducements.
Q2: How does the sender state weigh the risks of one approach over another when
seeking support for a sanction regime?
The logic of the sender state is important as the study seeks to both learn from and
contribute to this logic in the future. The sender state must also take risks when utilizing either
secondary sanctions or positive inducements and receptiveness can be a function of the
legitimacy of these actions.
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Q3: What does the partner state stand to lose from abiding by the overall sanction
regime?
Costs are an essential aspect to aid in understanding the logic of the partner state and in
doing so contributes to the ability of this study to draw realistic conclusions toward the end of
causal analysis as to why the partner state did or did not abide by the regime. What they have to
gain in most cases is the maintenance of access to the U.S. Market and offsetting positive
inducements. The question provides insight into what the partner sees as the cost and if it is
worth it.
Q4: How did firms in the partner state weigh the effects of secondary sanctions or
positive inducements against their interests?
The calculus of firms is a vital aspect of this study. It can be nearly unilateral from the
position of the state, as the state seeks what is best for itself the firms do the same. However, as
noted, they are much more risk-averse, and diplomacy is not nearly as much of a factor as
revenue. As such the calculus of the firms actions in response to U.S. actions plays a role in both
coercing the partner state one way or the other and allowing analysis of a particular venue toward
causing the desired result for the U.S.
Q5: Were there any other overt variables affecting the case that do not fall in with the
outlined variables of the study?
As with any study, it would be unreasonable to expect that causal analysis is limited to a
narrow scope of variables outlined in any one study. As such these questions serve to draw
forward any variables unaccounted for allowing for both the understanding of their impact and as
a basis for inclusion in future studies on the subject.
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The questions above were selected to be generalized enough to apply to any cases
seeking to answer the research question posed by this study but also allow for specific areas of
each case study to be compared relating to the independent variables. These questions serve as a
framework to facilitate case selection, evaluation, and applicability to policymakers and scholars
of future studies alike. Most importantly the questions open the doors for discussion of specific
factors in each case study to provide a comprehensive analysis of which to conclude.
LIMITATIONS
As within all studies, limitations are present and affect the methods and results alike. For
this study, there are several limitations. The first limitation is that some forms of positive
inducements, such as issue linkages trend in a grey area considered as both coercive and positive
inducements (Lacy and Niou 2004). To combat this grey area and for sake of drawing a
definitive line between “the carrot and the stick”, issue linkages in discussion take only the form
of those that are used in a positive note, to forge cooperation without the use of coercion. This
limitation is important because issue linkages, although not a primary focus of this study, is a
notable means by which positive inducements can be achieved. A second limitation is that
utilizing trade data as a metric for my independent variables reflects that I am not an economist
by trade therefore the use of the metrics are taken at face value without the in-depth analysis that
economic scholars would put into deciding which trade factors to utilize. A third limitation is the
current implications of the data. Both of the case studies being examined are recent
developments, as recently as early 2021, new data and statements are being released on both
cases and therefore the ability for this study to be all-encompassing is much more limited than
that of a traditional fully studied historical case analysis.
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Another limitation is that of the zero-sum game which comes at the expense of
assumptions. Any assumption in a study comes with inherent risk. In this study it is not
farfetched to assume that all actors in both case studies are rational actors, however, sovereignty
and rational choice although prevalent, may not yield the results that are expected. This is to say
that in the event a situation arises in which the cost of sanctions by the U.S. is equal to the
expected gain or loss of the partner's situation with the target state, a rational assumption is that
the partner values access to the U.S. market over other relationships and therefore would choose
the option that favors the U.S. This however cannot be guaranteed and is a limitation of this
study. In both cases to be examined this does not occur however for future studies in this realm,
it is imperative to state that a stalemate of cost-benefit for the partner state in no way guarantees
the U.S. success in the quest to gain support for a sanction’s regime. A final limitation is that the
cases selected, although considered rigorously, are a subject of my own bias and not a reflection
of all cases in which the U.S. seeks out European support.
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IRAN CASE STUDY
History shows that the U.S. has an embedded policy on Iran one that is most notably
attributed to two things, nuclear proliferation, and sanctions. In line with the latter, the U.S. has
recognized that to enact effective sanctions against Iran the support of European partners is
paramount. This realization is not new, in actuality, the U.S. stumbled upon it. "According to
one senior banking executive based in Europe: ‘When the United States began using its
secondary sanctions, it didn't know if it would work. There was trial and error involved. If at that
time, all of the European central banks resisted these measures, it is uncertain if the U.S. could
target them.’" (Meagher 2020, 1013). Instead of resistance, history shows that compliance was
the choice made by European firms and as such a strong foothold that has evolved into the
modern-day secondary sanctions was established. “Unfortunately for the EU, the various
European central banks did not respond aggressively, and the United States’ reliance on
secondary sanctions has only increased. (Meagher 2020, 1013). This precedent of compliance
provides a starting point from which this case study will demonstrate, analyze and seek to
operationalize causal relationships to uncover what conditions make secondary sanctions
effective in gaining support for a sanction's regime. This case to be examined differs from those
of the past through a crucial aspect, mutual interests. In the past, as noted, the U.S. and the EU's
interests aligned and thus fostered compliance, complementing secondary sanctions and the
participation of firms. That is not the case in modern times. With the U.S. unilateral withdrawal
from the JCPOA and subsequent reimposition of sanctions on Iran, the interests between the U.S.
and the EU are quite the opposite.
This opposition between the U.S. and partner states provides a foundation on which to
base this case. Through statistical data, evidence demonstrating secondary sanctions were
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effective even when met with resistance from the partner states can be derived. After the
ratification of the JCPOA trade between Iran and European partners, specifically, the EU for this
data skyrocketed. EU imports from Iran grew 347% from 2015 and exports to Iran grew 27%
(Directorate General for Trade 2021, 3). These numbers would continue to increase in 2017
where an additional 84% more imports and 31% more exports making the trade between the EU
and Iran in 2017 more valuable than all trade between the two countries from 2013-2016
collectively (Directorate General for Trade 2021, 3). Iran’s GDP also followed this upward trend
increasing from $384.95 Billion USD in 2015 to $445.35 Billion USD in 2017 (GDP (Current
US$) 2021, np). “Following the re-imposition of US sanctions, EU oil imports have quickly
ground to a halt, with other non-EU importing countries, such as China, India, Japan and South
Korea also gradually reducing exposure to Iran’s oil market.” (Alcaro and Desi 2019, 8). The
trade data demonstrates evidence of this claim, in 2018 at the peak of Iran-EU interdependence
petroleum imports from Iran were valued at 8,255 million euros; in 2019 this decreased to only
13 Million Euros worth of petroleum which is over a 90% decrease (Directorate General for
Trade 2021, 5). Iran’s GDP plunge complements the trade data as the drop to a GDP of $294.36
Billion USD in 2018 and $258.25 Billion USD in 2019 mark the lowest it had been since circa
2005 (GDP (Current US$) 2021, np). Notwithstanding the EU, Iran’s exports to the world
dropped 55% in 2019 and another 50% from that in 2020 (Directorate General for Trade 2021,
8). The sanctions regime targeted the petroleum exports of Iran viciously. “The United States is
targeting private and public sector entities around the world that engage in sanctionable conduct,
including those involved in procuring petroleum and petroleum products from Iran to Syria,
China, and elsewhere.” (OFAC Advisory 2019, 1). Through these targeted sanctions firms also
stood to lose a substantial amount. “Boeing and Airbus will lose contracts worth roughly $39
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billion to replenish Iran’s aging fleet of commercial planes as part of the Trump administration’s
reimposition of sanctions.” (Mufson and Paletta 2018, np). Even with these losses, a Boeing VP
stated that "We will consult with the U.S. Government on next steps. As we have throughout this
process, we’ll continue to follow the U.S. Government’s lead.” (Mufson and Paletta 2018, np).
This demonstrates the innate conformity to the U.S. sanctions by the partner states and their
firms alike.
The examination of this case study will proceed to dissect the factors and conditions that
facilitated the success of these sanctions. To that end, this case will be conducted utilizing the
standardized questions established as the primary framework and will proceed in four sections.
The first section will address the questions, “What methods for gaining support for a sanction
regime were utilized within the case?” and “How does the sender state weigh the risks of one
approach over another when seeking support for a sanction regime?”. Through this evidence,
secondary sanction implementation will be utilized to complement evidence demonstrating the
U.S. thought processes and considerations for implementing secondary sanctions within their
overall sanction regime on Iran. The second section will address the questions "What does the
partner state stand to lose from abiding by the overall sanction regime?” and “How did firms in
the partner state weigh the effects of secondary sanctions or positive inducements against their
interests?”. A discussion of what is at stake for the partner states and firm reactions utilizes
statistical data, political rhetoric, and legal documents as evidence to provide an answer to “why”
the secondary sanctions were effective and what conditions are necessary for their efficacy. The
final two sections are comprised of a discussion of a singular overt variable that must be
accounted for within the study and a conclusion readdressing the key elements and takeaways
from this case that will be applied toward the final conclusion drawn by the study in its entirety.
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METHODS OF SUPPORT AND SENDER STATE CONSIDERATIONS
Secondary sanctions are the method of support demonstrated in this case. Even without
any competing tactics, positive inducements, this case demonstrates the conditions that yield
demonstrable results from their use. In 2018 under President Trump, the U.S. unilaterally
removed itself from JCPOA and immediately reimposed crippling sanctions on Iran. “The
Trump administration has adopted successive rounds of restrictive policies aimed at squeezing
Iran’s economy by targeting key export-oriented sectors, particularly energy exports. These
comprised the re-imposition of all sanctions suspended under the deal, including the so-called
“secondary” sanction targeting foreign companies doing business with Iran; a refusal to extend
oil import wavers to eight countries14 in early May 2019 and, finally, the sanctioning of Iran’s
metals industry, a key employer and export-oriented economic sector.” (Alcaro and Desi 2019,
7). President Trump justified his decision to remove the U.S. from the deal; dictating that
"Trump said the agreement failed to address Iran’s ballistic missile program and its proxy
warfare in the region, and he claimed that the sunset provisions would enable Iran to pursue
nuclear weapons in the future.” (Robinson 2021). This action caused substantial amounts of
well-founded unrest from Iran as they berated the U.S. for not keeping its promises under the
agreement. Although this was to be expected from Iran, what makes this case especially
significant and necessary for the study is that partner states have continued to attempt to maintain
the deal even with the U.S. reimposition of secondary sanctions. “As long as Iran continues to
implement its nuclear related commitments, as it is doing so far, the European Union will remain
committed to the continued full and effective implementation of the nuclear deal.” (Iran Deal
2018, np).
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Even with the vocalized position of partner states regarding the U.S. unilateral
withdrawal; the U.S., as the sender state, was very aggressive with its approach. The secondary
sanction approach was intuitive to U.S. leaders because of the advantage that the U.S. market
provided them over the partner states. “Senior U.S. officials have called on America’s European
allies to capitulate to the reimposition of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran, the logic being
that European companies cannot risk losing access to the U.S. market and therefore have no
choice but to renege on promises they made to Iran.” (Hengel et. al. 2021, np). The costs if this
approach were to backfire did not seem to be weighed as the pragmatic Trump administration
was sure that the initial approach would be successful. This is imperative because the U.S. needs
partner support for the regime to be effective on the target state. “Europe is the essential element
in the U.S. design to inflict “unprecedented financial pressure” on the Iranian regime.” (Hengel
et. al. 2021, np). Of note, some risks were that the partner state would not comply it would be
severely damaging to U.S. foreign policy and the transatlantic partnerships. “The United States
will have driven Europe into the arms of Russia and China, ceded the commanding political high
ground to Iran, and potentially done long-term damage to the credibility of U.S. coercive
diplomacy, with respect to economic sanctions and beyond.” (Hengel et. al. 2021, np). This
outcome although not likely, demonstrated the worst-case scenario for the U.S. The likelihood of
a drastic shift that would have a lasting international impact in exchange for trade with Iran and
the semblance of values did not seem high. With this knowledge, policymakers understood that
they could not reimpose such aggressive measures overnight. To mitigate that consideration the
U.S. provided a brief window coined the “Wind-Down Period” encompassing both a 90-day
period for some sanctions and a 180-day period for others. (Frequently Asked Questions 2018, 1-

47
2). Notable sanctions affecting partners states and firms for both the 90- day and 180-day
periods are depicted in Figure 1.

Table 1: Wind Down Period/ Sanctions Reimposition Table
90-Day Wind Down *
Sanctions on the purchase or acquisition of U.S. dollar
banknotes by the Government of Iran
Sanctions on Iran’s trade in gold or precious metals
Sanctions on the direct or indirect sale, supply, or transfer to
or from Iran of graphite, raw, or semi-finished metals such
as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating
industrial processes
Sanctions on significant transactions related to the purchase
or sale of Iranian rials, or the maintenance of significant
funds or accounts outside the territory of Iran

Sanctions on the purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of
the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt
Sanctions on Iran’s automotive sector
Activities undertaken pursuant to specific licenses issued in
connection with the Statement of Licensing Policy for
Activities Related to the Export or Re-export to Iran of
Commercial Passenger Aircraft and Related Parts and
Services

180-Day Wind Down **
Sanctions on Iran’s port operators, and shipping
and shipbuilding sectors, including on the Islamic
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), South
Shipping Line Iran, or their affiliates
Sanctions on petroleum-related transactions with
specific Iranian Oil producing companies
Sanctions on transactions by foreign financial
institutions with the Central Bank of Iran and
designated Iranian financial institutions
Sanctions on the provision of specialized financial
messaging services to the Central Bank of Iran and
Iranian financial institutions described in Section
104(c)(2)(E)(ii) of the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA)
Sanctions on the provision of underwriting
services, insurance, or reinsurance
Sanctions on Iran’s energy sector

* 90-Day period ended on August 5, 2018
**180-Day period ended on November 4, 2018
Source: “Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Re-Imposition of ...” U.S.
Department of the Treasury , May 8, 2018.
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/jcpoa_winddown_faqs.pdf.

The wind-down periods provide an important area of insight for this study. These two
windows of time forced both partner states and firms alike to weigh the costs vs benefits of their
choices regarding the sanction regime. The U.S. recognized that this would be the case and these
periods represent the culmination of U.S. considerations toward their partner states. The
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following sections will demonstrate how both partner states and firms reacted to this period, and
that it provides evidence toward H2 of this study “The lower the cost to the partner state the
higher the efficacy of secondary sanctions to gain support via cooperation”.
PARTNER STATE AND FIRM CONSIDERATIONS
Scholars note that economic trade was not the main goal of European partner interaction
with Iran. “From a European perspective, sustaining economic exchange with Iran is not about
advancing economic gains but rather about consolidating an agreement which is driven by
pragmatic security concerns.” (Batmanghelidj and Hellman 2018, 1). The high representative of
the EU, Frederica Mogherini, emphasized that the reimposition of sanctions is worrying and that
the EU will “act in accordance with its security interests and to protect its economic
investments.” (Iran Deal 2018, np). This connotation of protecting interests would be the
sustained rhetoric of the partner states regarding the U.S. sanctions regime. The interests that
partner states seek to protect would not only benefit them, as it turns out there are some that run
in parallel with the interests of Iran. One such interest is “the ability to engage in what is
considered constructive and legitimate bilateral trade and investment irrespective of unilateral
moves by the United States.” (Batmanghelidj and Hellman 2018, 5). Compliance with the U.S.
secondary sanctions would undermine this interest substantially and therefore affect the
legitimacy of the partners on an international level. “European economies can certainly survive
without trade with Iran, but European sovereignty in foreign affairs can hardly survive passive
compliance with the new dictates from the White House. Compliance would mean few would
trust the E.U. as a sovereign actor in foreign and security policies.” (Bildt 2018, np). In the eyes
of the partner state, willingly complying with the sanction’s regime will force them to accept
certain losses. These losses come in a main diplomatic sense vice an economic sense. The EU
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has been striving to hold its own on the international stage for decades. Notable victories toward
that cause have come through their relationships with Iran. Scholars note that the agreement of
Iran with the Paris accords in 2004 was a major boost for the EU as an international actor. (Posch
2010, 4). In the mind of the EU, they cannot afford to take any steps in the opposite direction and
compliance would represent a major step against their goals. “To preserve their countries’
independent foreign policies — and an autonomous global role for the European Union —
Europeans now have no choice but to stay in the deal and defy, or threaten to defy, the United
States.” (Hengel et. al. 2021, np). In doing this they would be putting themselves at the risk of
economic detriment in an effort to uphold their values. This provides evidence that the main
concern of the partner states regarding the sanctions was not what would happen to them
economically but more so what would happen diplomatically. This evidence reinforces a
hypothesis of this study by demonstrating that the economic cost was low enough that diplomatic
considerations outweighed them drastically. Little to no mention of the economic losses of
partner states is considered. The diplomatic concerns are well-founded but they do not consider
all of the parties invested within the sanction's regime. Partner states do not control their destiny
in its entirety, multinational firms located within these countries play a large role and tend to
operate autonomously allowing for the U.S. sanctions regime to gain support even with the
political discontent it causes.
The wind-down periods put the partner leadership in a difficult position regarding their
domestic firms. They needed to reassure Iran that they would be upholding their end of the deal
while also gaining domestic firm and banking support to allow that. Firms held a large role in the
difficulties that partners had in reassuring Iran of their commitments and abilities to offset the
cost placed by the U.S. The third hypothesis of this study lends itself to explaining why firms
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were so contradictory to the partner state's ideals. "H3: Secondary sanctions targeted at firms are
more likely to yield concessions than those directed at government entities”. Evidence toward
this hypothesis comes in various forms. The European Investment Bank was a crucial blow to
diplomat's attempts at preservation of the JCPOA. “Asking the EIB to invest in Iran has
“symbolic value as EU officials see it as one of the easiest to deliver on in response to Iran’s
demands that it show proof of its commitment to the nuclear deal.”” (Gerdziunas 2018, np). The
bank was reluctant to aid in the request of partner diplomats. ""The bank is unhappy with the
Commission proposal because the bank raises funds on U.S. markets,” … Almost a third of EIB
lending is dollar denominated, exposing the bank to potential U.S. sanctions, which will begin to
take effect in August.” (Gerdziunas 2018, np). Banking services not only affected diplomatic
endeavors but also played a substantial role in other firms' actions as well.
“Every few days a new headline proclaims the departure of a major multinational
company from the Iranian market. But the "wind-down" of commercial operations in Iran
by multinationals such as France's Total, Germany's Siemens, or Italy's Danieli is not due
to their operations having necessarily become illegal…many Iranian stateowned
enterprises that had been removed from the SDN list as part of the nuclear deal are set to
be re-listed, posing a significant challenge for some industrial joint-ventures. But many
European companies had found joint venture partners or customers in Iran’s private
sector, whose entities are not to be re-listed. For these companies, the decision to leave
Iran is driven by operational considerations which stem from an inability to secure
important third-party services, especially banking services.” (Batmanghelidj and Hellman
2018, 6).
Banks, included in “firms” as a term for the study but distinct for this discussion, have attempted
to compensate for these sanctions in order to continue to work with Iran, however, the
concessions outweighed the gains. “There is nothing inherently more remunerative about
servicing transactions to and from Iran than for any other market, and to whatever extent banks
have sought to add a surcharge to transaction fees in order to account for the additional
compliance costs, the assessments of reputational and legal risk have typically outweighed the
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expected value of the potential “Iran book” at nearly all European financial institutions.”
(Batmanghelidj and Hellman 2018, 6). ““It would be suicide to do any new business or funding
for Iran or Iran-related companies without explicit guarantees from the U.S. government. They
have us by the throat because so much business is conducted and cleared in dollars,” one
European investment banker said.” (Kar and Irish 2018, np). This would become the standard
realization across most large firms that had anything to do with Iran transactions. Notable firms
such as French oil giants Total released statements on this position. "Total will not continue the
SP11 (South Pars 11) project and will have to unwind all related operations before 4 November
2018, unless Total is granted a specific project waiver by U.S. authorities with the support of the
French and European authorities.” (Kar and Irish 2018, np). Total’s announcement was not the
first major partner firm to dictate changes toward their Iran policy in lieu of the renewed sanction
regime. “Total's announcement comes after German insurer Allianz ALVG.DE and Danish oil
product tanker operator Maersk Tankers said they were winding down their businesses in Iran.
Joe Kaeser, the CEO of Germany's Siemens SIEGn.DE, told CNN his company would not be
able to do any new business with Tehran.” (Kar and Irish 2018, np). The U.S. domination of the
global financial system makes any effort towards mitigating these farfetched. Some scholars note
that the partner states could attempt other methods to retain economic relations with Iran, but
they would only intensify tension with the U.S. for both diplomats and corporations (Aslan 2018,
19). This provides evidence toward the third hypothesis of this study “H3: Secondary sanctions
targeted at firms are more likely to yield concessions than those directed at government entities".
As noted above multiple utilized the wind-down periods as the U.S. desired, to cease operations
thus enforcing that countering position with their states and giving the U.S. necessary leverage
against the partner state governments regarding the sanction regime. The cost of disobeying the
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sanction regime was continually growing for the partner states while the cost of abandoning their
ties with Iran was becoming less significant.
Notable firms refused to continue to work with Iran to the point that a central financial
institution, in the EIB, refused to provide the partner state with the backing it desired to follow
its interests. Multiple firms have gone public with their reasoning which reaffirms the causal
mechanics of this hypothesis. Siemens CEO Joe Kaeser was very blunt with his discussion as to
why his firm had to abide by the sanctions. In an interview with CNN, the following was noted
"Trump's decision to reimpose Iran sanctions means his company has to fall in line. "There's a
primacy of a political system. If that primacy says 'this is what we're going to do', then that is
exactly what we're going to do,"” (Petroff 2018, np). A statement released by the company
Siemens, apart from the CEO’s interview reinforced the same sentiment. “We have strictly
complied with all relevant export control restrictions in the past and will continue to do so in the
future.” (Petroff 2018, np). The position taken by this firm is to be expected. Along with other
firms such as Airbus, and Total oil, they are global firms that stand to take substantial losses
from the exclusion of the U.S. market. Siemens alone employs over 50,000 workers in the U.S.
and makes $20 Billion USD a year from the U.S. accounting for roughly 20% percent of its
global sales (Petroff 2018, np). This cost is far greater than that of violating the EU blocking
statute that prohibits compliance with secondary sanctions. Anna Bradshaw, a partner at Peters &
Peters Solicitors in London states that the blocking statute seems to be treated as an aggravating
factor and that “evidence of steps taken to follow the EU regime could be invoked as proof of
how a company is violating the U.S. regulations.” (Love 2020, np). This fear illuminates the
value firms put on the U.S. market, they would rather skip out on domestic rules and subject
themselves to that persecution vice building evidence against themselves that could be used
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against them from the U.S. perspective. This blatant disregard for partner state statutes and goals
in pursuit of self-sufficiency and protection demonstrates provides sound evidence toward this
hypothesis.
With firms’ continual removal from relations with Iran and other cascading effects taking
place, partner states were frantically trying to prevent the deal from falling through. To this end,
the partner states met with Iran to create a nine-point deal as a measure to solidify the deal
without the U.S. involved. “Their efforts focus on nine key areas including maintaining
economic ties with Iran, continuing Iran's ability to sell oil and gas products and protecting EU
companies doing business in Iran. The EU is also looking at how it could develop special
financing vehicles for doing business with Iran.” (Afp 2018, np). A notable achievement toward
this goal was the creation of INSTEX. “In January 2019, the E3 established a Special Purpose
Vehicle (SPV), called Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), allowing for a
means of trade with Iran.” (Alcaro and Dessi 2019, 9). The main issue is that INSTEX is only
applicable to food and medical supplies which already are exempt from U.S. Sanctions
(Robinson 2021). Even with these measures history has shown that Iran was unsatisfied with
these actions as they did not provide relief comparable to the burden of reimposed U.S.
sanctions. Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif acknowledged this reality in a statement discussing the
support received, “Under the current circumstances, the EU’s political will is not enough to
preserve the nuclear deal.” (Gerdziunas 2018, np). The continual ramifications of the U.S.
unilateral withdrawal did not stop the political rhetoric of condemnation toward U.S. actions.
This however was met with unwilling compliance with the secondary sanctions.
Through the discussion above concerning the trend of economic relationships between
European partners and Iran, evidence has pinpointed the exact moment during which the
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secondary sanctions took effect and gained quantifiable results. Through these results evidence
toward the third hypothesis of this study has been given as well as validation of this study’s
second hypothesis is provided. “H2: The lower the economic cost to the partner state the higher
the efficacy of secondary sanctions to gain support via cooperation.”. The cost for the partner
states was relatively low. This is backed both by statistical data and the prevailing rhetoric of
diplomats. Although the EU was Iran's top trading partner before the reimposition of sanctions,
as for the EU, in 2018 Iran was their 57th highest trading partner (European Union Trade Balance
2018). For reference, the U.S. was the second-largest trading partner of the EU aside from
Switzerland (European Union Trade Balance 2018). The rhetoric of diplomats was
unquestionably one-sided with goals to both attempt to retain the JCPOA and to not abide by
sanctions. The data utilized in this case serves as evidence that their rhetoric did not match the
occurrences in reality. “European politicians do not possess the power to force European
economic actors to engage in commercial activities with Iran given the shadow of U.S.
sanctions.” (Fathollah-Nejad 2018, np). The high economic cost posed by U.S. secondary
sanctions drastically outweighed the costs of cutting specific ties with Iran. The value of the U.S.
market to partner states cannot be understated, trade with Iran and economic autonomy for the
European partner states were no match for the threat of losing U.S. market access and drastically
affecting their economic stability on the international stage.
AN OVERT VARIABLE
An overt variable that was not specifically accounted for is the security perspective that
partner states held regarding the JCPOA. The partner states saw the JCPOA not as an economic
deal per se, but more as a security issue under control. “From a European perspective, attempts
to salvage the JCPOA are not about “fighting the United States” nor “evading U.S. sanctions”
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but rather about creating the conditions that enable the EU to make good on its commitments
under a deal which it considers to be crucial for international security.” (Batmanghelidj and
Hellman 2018, 4). As shown above, this perspective was a driving factor toward the partner
actions, including the implementation of the blocking statute and its update. It also attributed to
the embedded political rhetoric of condemnation toward U.S. sanctions and in time led to
INSTEX and the deep desire to keep the JCPOA alive even without the U.S. The economic cost
was large to seek these endeavors which would maintain their security interests and also help
them retain their international credibility which was another underlying factor. With these
considerations at the forefront of the European partner state's goals, they must be considered as
affecting the actions those states had taken throughout the case. Even with these effects, the
results provided evidence showing that European partners unwillingly abided by the U.S.
sanction regime and provided the U.S. the support it needed to financially cripple Iran.
CONCLUSION
The case study of the U.S. seeking and gaining support for its sanction regime toward
Iran is still unfolding in current events. Although it is recent, it provides a dynamic to study that
has not been prevalent in the study of secondary sanctions over recent history. The partner state's
discontent with the sanctions is not new however their lack of parallel interests toward the target
state is a phenomenon that opens a large door for scholarly contribution. In an effort to exploit
this door, the case discussed demonstrates that the secondary sanctions imposed upon partner
states not only worked because of their economic cost but also because of the direct impact of
firms. When directly targeted with secondary sanctions firms act autonomously based upon their
interests, of which maintaining access to the U.S. market is top of the list. Firms, in this case,
demonstrated that they would rather be subjected to domestic punishment than international
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punishment via U.S. secondary sanctions. Implementing the logic that secondary sanctions
directly targeting firms will yield more results than those only targeting partner state entities has
allowed for evidence to further dive into its causal mechanics and provide validation toward this
hypothesis. Firms directly targeted by the secondary sanctions began to abide by them at a rate
that could not be ignored by the partner state governments. Government back banks were also
refusing to help the partner states toward their cause of continuing relations with Iran. "As it
stands, the vast majority of European banks will not transact directly with Iranian banks.”
(Batmanghelidj and Hellman 2018, 7). These occurrences illuminate a tool for U.S. policymakers
in efforts to gain European support for its sanctions regime.
Throughout history the interests of partner states and those of the U.S. have trended in
parallel, providing ease of cooperation of sanction regimes toward states that did not fit those
interests. Iran serves as a prime example of this. European partners have not only agreed with
past U.S. policies toward Iran but also supplemented them with favorable actions of their own.
This case utilizes a rare window of severely contrasting interests of the U.S. and partner states to
take the logical next step in sanctions research. Utilizing statistical data, political rhetoric, and
legal documents as evidence, this case has demonstrated that secondary sanctions are effective at
gaining support when the economic cost of abiding by them is low. The economic costs of
discontinuing relations with Iran paled in comparison to those of losing the U.S. market.
Economic considerations of the partner states and the firms within it reinforce this to
demonstrate that such economic impact even outweighed consistent political rhetoric
condemning the sanctions. This case is but one side of the coin involving U.S. tactics to gain
support. This study will move forward to as, what happens when the dynamics change, and
secondary sanctions are not a favorable tool? The case to follow will examine this in a case
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relating to U.S. sanctions on Russia and how the dynamics of a high economic cost for
compliance affect the causal mechanics of both sanctions and positive inducement efficacy.
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RUSSIA CASE STUDY
Addressing Russia and its aggressive attempts to undermine U.S. interests has been an
enduring task for U.S. policymakers in recent history. Policymakers have continued to find ways
to mitigate the Russian aggression and curtail their coercive influence in Europe however, it is
realized that the U.S. cannot do this without the support of its European partner states. In line
with this policy goal, the following case examines the U.S. attempts to gain support from
partners toward implementing sanctions against Russia. This specific regime seeks to curtail
Russian undermining of U.S. policy as well as the exclusion of Ukraine from the Russian gas
market via targeting two Russian energy pipelines, the Nord Stream 2 and Turk Stream. The case
of energy pipelines and Ukrainian exclusion is not the first time the U.S. has sought European
partner support for sanctions against Russia. In 2014, with Russia’s invasion and occupation of
Ukraine’s Crimea region, the U.S. sought out support from its European partners almost
immediately. “As the invasion of Ukraine progressed in 2014, the Obama Administration
considered EU support for sanctions to be crucial, as the EU had more extensive trade and
investment ties with Russia than the United States. (Rennack et. al. 2022, 1). Notwithstanding
European support, the U.S. implemented sectoral sanctions on Russia in response to this event.
These sanctions were designed to hinder a specific element of the economy while not broadly
affecting the overall population of Russia or all economic sectors in which partner states have
invested. Amongst these sectoral sanctions are sanctions implemented on specific firms within
Russia’s financial, defense and energy sectors including Gazprombank, Gazpromneft pipeline
company, and Gazprom, Gazpromnefts parent company, and a firm of importance regarding this
study (Rennack et.al. 2022, 9). The sectoral sanctions prohibit U.S. trade and investment with
these firms including equity investments and financing, essentially removing their access to the
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U.S. open market. These sectoral sanctions reflect early actions foreshadowing what has become
the overall sanction regime that is the focal point of this case, the U.S. sanctions toward Russia
and Russian firms relating to utilizing energy exports as a coercive or political tool.
The Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression Act (DASKA) was the
vessel from which sanctions aligning with U.S. goals were to be implemented. DASKA
continued targeting the above-named firms as well as expanding the breadth of the regime to not
only outline goals toward sanctioning Russia across the various actions they have taken since
2014, Crimea, election interference, etc; but also to denote specific secondary sanctions. “Other
important provisions of DASKA include mandatory secondary sanctions aimed at the energy
sector that will be concerning to U.S. and Western energy firms, as well as to foreign
governments that have been key partners in the sanctions program.” (Blanc and Weiss 2019, 9).
This sanction regime once again alters the calculus of previous sanction regimes in that the
interests of the U.S. and the partners it seeks support from are divergent from each other.
Germany and the European firms invested in the pipelines do not want to abide by U.S. sanctions
as they have substantial gains at stake. The U.S. seeks to protect its interests and deter Russian
corruption via the use of natural gas pipeline dependency.
Since 2014 the U.S. calculus has continued to evolve into one that considered both the
partner states but also their undeniable dependency on Russian gas. In 2019 41% of the EU's
natural gas imports and 47% of their solid fuels came from Russia (“From Where Do We Import
Energy ?” 2022). Within this period, in efforts to combat Russian aggression and punish them for
the previously mentioned actions, the U.S. signed four executive orders implementing sanctions
on individuals, entities, and some firms toward the goal of curtailing the Russian actions. Within
these executive orders is a crucial source for this study. Protecting Europe's Energy Security act
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of 2019, as Amended (PEESA), provides measures toward sanctioning Russian energy pipelines
to reduce the ability of Russia to utilize energy dependence as a method of coercion of European
partner states. With Russia targeted through an expanding sanctions regime, quantifiable results
were not as tangible as policymakers had hoped for. A change in tactics was necessary to gain
the European support the U.S. needed to achieve its goals regarding sanctions on Russia. The
discussion to follow will illuminate those changes in tactics and demonstrate two key findings.
First, sanctions regarding the pipelines, including secondary sanctions, are do not yield much
efficacy toward obtaining European support. Secondly, the inducement side of diplomacy
yielded tangible results. The discussion to follow will explore both findings while providing
insight into the conditions necessary for positive inducement efficacy.
To that end, the analysis to follow will be conducted in five sections of which four utilize
the structured focused comparison framework to address the standardized questions of the study
while implementing the hypotheses as well. The first section provides a brief background on the
energy pipelines to be examined for the purpose of this study, the NordStream 2 and the
TurkStream. The second section addresses the first two questions of the framework and provides
insight into how this case validates the first hypothesis of this study. The third section describes
the partner state considerations regarding the case and what each partner stands to lose which
gives merit to the causal mechanics of their actions. The fourth section focuses on firms and their
actions and reactions to both secondary sanctions and positive inducements. This helps to
validate the third hypothesis of this study. The final section will draw overall conclusions on the
case study of the Russian pipelines and complete the necessary preparations for a comparison of
this case with the Iran case in the conclusion to follow.
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RUSSIAN PIPELINES
The goal of excluding Ukraine from Russian gas markets presents itself in many ways,
most notably is the efforts toward completing The Nord Stream 2. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline is
the sequel to the currently operating Nord Stream 1 pipeline. Since it became operational in
2011, the Nord Stream 1 pipeline has allowed Russia to realize steps toward its goal of reducing
the number of natural gas exports to Europe transit through Ukraine. "Before Nord Stream 1
opened in 2011, about 80% of Russia’s natural gas exports to Europe transited Ukraine. In 2019,
about 45% of these exports transited Ukraine.” (Belkin et.al. 2021, 1). Even though this is a goal
of Russia, the reasons for European engagement are apparent as well. An estimate by the
European Parliament shows that “refurbishment [of Ukrainian pipelines] would cost vary from
$2.5 billion to $12 billion, while the bill for total replacement, according to a 2017 KPMG study,
could be as high as $17.8 billion.” Overall costs for Nord Stream 2 are estimated at about 9.5
billion euros ($11 billion)” (Amaro 2021, np). The completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline
could see that Ukraine become excluded from the Russian natural gas exchange and as such it
provides Russia with leverage that it can use over Ukraine and other partner nations to further its
will within the region. This would come at a cost of circa 3 billion USD per year for Ukraine as
that is the going rate of tariffs on Russian gas that currently transits through their purview
(Jacobsen 2021, 2). The pipeline will double the natural gas provided directly from Russia to
Germany. This increase provides a dependence issue that the U.S. believes Russia will exploit
against the west. This illuminates a core concern around this pipeline. Germany is vitally
dependent upon imports for its energy sector. "Oil and gas are the lifeblood of Germany’s
manufacturing economy, but the country produces very little energy domestically and is
dependent on imports for 98% of its oil and 92% of its gas supply.” (Stevens 2019, np). This
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demand is met in large part via Russian exports from which 40% of German oil needs and 35%
of German natural gas needs are met (Stevens 2019, np). The addition of the Nord Stream 2
pipeline will only increase these percentages thus fundamentally tying the German economy to
Russia providing them substantial leverage and coercive power on one of the European Union’s
largest and most vital economies.
Russia understands that Germany has ties to the west and that their goals run counter to
what German allies would like. Because of this Russia has sought to realize the goals mentioned
above through a venture more suited to their ideals by aiming at Turkey via the TurkStream
pipeline. "TurkStream is a new export gas pipeline stretching from Russia to Turkey across the
Black Sea. The first of the pipeline's two strings are intended for Turkish consumers, while the
second one is delivering gas to southern and southeastern Europe.” (TurkStream 2022). This
pipeline became operational in 2020 and began to provide resources directly to Turkey. This
direct route now bypasses Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, and Bulgaria who were all entities of the
north-south Trans-Balkan Pipeline (TBP) which provided Russian energy resources to turkey
until January of 2020 (Garding et.al. 2021, 1). The pipeline brings forth questions of energy
dependence on Russia as well as the notable leverage of demand. Although operational, unlike
Nord Stream 2, this pipeline has drawn the eye of the U.S. as a potential harbinger for Russian
coercion. The exclusion of Ukraine and the growing Turkish and Russian cooperation are factors
drawing this pipeline to the limelight of discussions, these reasons also gained this pipeline a
U.S. sanction regime along with the Nord Stream 2. This sanction regime seeks out the support
of European partners to help mitigate the Russian coercion and as to be discussed below is, the
U.S. approach differs from the previous case substantially.
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METHODS OF GAINING SUPPORT AND SENDER STATE CONSIDERATIONS
Addressing the first question of the framework, “What methods for gaining support for a
sanction regime were utilized with the case?”, this case immediately differs from those
previously examined. In the case of Russia, both secondary sanctions and positive inducements
are utilized toward the U.S. goals. Although an immediate difference is apparent there are
similarities. Much like the previous case, European partners do not want to support the U.S.
sanction regime, they counter it making this another suitable case for study. "The EU
Commission has responded to the US sanctions in relation to Nord Stream 2 by stating that the
EU does not recognise the extraterritorial application of US sanctions relating to the pipeline
which it considers to be contrary to international law.” (McDougall et.al. 2020, np). The Primary
sanction regime is targeted at Russia because the U.S. believes that Russia seeks to utilize
increased pipelines to both exclude Ukraine and raise energy dependence on Russia and in turn
increase their coercive power over the European markets. In the recently amended Protecting
Europe’s Energy and Security Act (PEESA), the U.S. specifically call out Russia on these causes
when justifying the necessity for action.
“We continue to call on Russia to cease using its energy resources for coercive purposes.
Russia uses its energy export pipelines to create national and regional dependencies on
Russian energy supplies, leveraging these dependencies to expand its political, economic,
and military influence, weaken European security, and undermine U.S. national security
and foreign policy interests. These pipelines also reduce European energy diversification,
and hence weaken European energy security.” (Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act
(PEESA) 2021, np).
This call-out is not the only action taken by the U.S. The U.S. is fully aware that to be
able to stint Russian energy dependency from its partners they will need the support of those
partners. This brings forth the second question in the framework, “How does the sender state
weigh the risks of one approach over another when seeking support for a sanction regime?”.
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Within the Russia-Germany relationship, the U.S. has understood the vast economic cost vs the
gains this pipeline has for its partner state. This is because although the dependency is a threat,
the potential of the economic gain for interaction with Russian pipelines is a newly found
untapped resource. This realization is a driving consideration for the U.S. In any scenario where
they seek support, the economic cost of secondary sanctions does not provide the calculus shift
necessary to sway European partners to its cause. “The United States and the EU generally have
sought to target individuals and entities responsible for offending policies and/or associated with
key Russian policymakers in a way that could get Russia to change its behavior while
minimizing collateral damage to the Russian people and to the economic interests of the
countries imposing sanctions.” (Rennack et. al. 2022, 1). Targeting sanctions through these
criteria would provide more amenable sanction support from partner states. Within this case, it is
not favorable to utilize these ideals as the significant investment from Germany, Turkey, and a
slew of European firms, to be discussed, makes sanctions a less preferable tool.
The Nordstream 2 pipeline provides a direct natural gas linkage from Russia to Germany
and in doing so sanctions that seek to prevent its completion can be taken as a counter to German
interests. This being the case the U.S. elected to utilize methods other than sanctions to gain their
support. The U.S. realized that in order to gain support from Germany that they would need to
demonstrate actions toward German interests regardless of their own. Although not a preferable
action, the U.S. values the German partnership and has continually had a goal of mending the
relationship between the two countries that had been tested during the tenure of former President
Trump. This demonstration came in the form of the U.S. deciding not to sanction a critical firm,
that if sanctioned had the potential to be the catalyst to stop the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. The U.S.
waived sanctions on the company Nordstream 2 AG which was a company created by Russian
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gas giants Gazprom, operating out of Switzerland, and was primarily commissioned for the
construction of the pipeline. Gazprom was forced to operate this company as a Swiss firm due to
the already imposed sanctions of DASKA and PEESA that targeted German firms directly. The
waiver of sanctions against these entities was cause for high contention as previous reports
provided conclusions that the company was engaging in sanctionable activities. A State
Department report sent to Congress concluded that Nord Stream 2 AG and its CEO, Matthias
Warnig, an ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, engaged in sanctionable activity.” (Shalal
et. al. 2021, np).
This would be seen as a positive inducement toward Germany not because it was
specifically a good thing, but it reinforced the U.S. commitment to mending their relationship
which has positive implications for both sides. If the U.S. had sanctioned Nord Stream 2 AG the
outcomes would have been negative for both parties yet the U.S. still needed German support
notwithstanding the specific sanctions against Nord Stream 2 AG. This provided a key aspect to
the U.S. calculus that allowed them to take a loss at stopping the pipeline, which was only a
method to achieve their overall goals, in order to gain ground with German cooperation. In return
for waiving the warranted sanctions, the U.S. was able to reach an agreement with Germany. The
U.S. and Germany released a joint statement demonstrating the newfound agreement which
committed Germany to impose sanctions on Russia if they acted in a coercive nature regarding
both the pipelines and Ukraine. This agreement aligned U.S. and German interests regarding
Russia and established compulsory support requirements should the conditions be met. The
agreement states:
“Should Russia attempt to use energy as a weapon or commit further aggressive acts
against Ukraine, Germany will take action at the national level and press for effective
measures at the European level, including sanctions, to limit Russian export capabilities
to Europe in the energy sector, including gas, and/or in other economically relevant
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sectors. This commitment is designed to ensure that Russia will not misuse any pipeline,
including Nord Stream 2, to achieve aggressive political ends by using energy as a
weapon.” (Joint Statement 2021, np).
The agreement would turn Germany against Russia in the event Russia attempts to "use energy
as a weapon or commit further aggressive acts against Ukraine," Germany will take steps on its
own and push for actions at the EU, including sanctions, "to limit Russian export capabilities to
Europe in the energy sector,"” (Lewis and Shalal 2021, np).
The non-imposition of these sanctions as a positive inducement toward Germany was a
much more feasible path to gaining cooperation in the U.S. calculus. German relations with the
Russian gas pipeline are complex and with deep economic ties. As such U.S. efforts to achieve
their overarching goals of limiting coercion and energy dependence via attempts to stop the
pipeline will undoubtedly do damage to German economic aspirations as well. Daniel Vajdich,
president of Yorktown Solutions, which advises the Ukrainian energy industry on the
Nordstream 2 Pipeline states "The only thing that can stop NS2 from becoming operational is
lifting the waivers and sanctioning ... Nord Stream AG, which they refuse to do," (Gardner 2021,
np). This provides merit to the U.S. actions as a positive inducement and demonstrates a key
consideration that the U.S. had when electing that positive inducements were a necessary
measure over secondary sanctions.
The TurkStream pipeline also poses a continuing threat to energy dependence in Europe.
Russia understands that diversity of its exports routes is important and as such the TurkSTream
can be viewed as a supplemental problem that is not receiving as much negotiation as the Nord
Stream 2 but has received the same amount of condemnation and sanctions. It retains a core
purpose mirroring that of the Nord Stream 2 which seeks to minimize Russian exports transiting
through Ukraine, and in addition to the Nord Stream 2, this pipeline stands to reduce those
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numbers exponentially. In 2017, 3% of Ukraine's GDP came from transit fees on Russian gas
exports, and this number has been in a steady decline since TurkStream became operational
(Jacobsen 2021, 2).
The U.S. sanctions regime implemented against both pipelines seeks to protect U.S.
interests however the secondary sanctions utilized toward the pipelines have neither been
aggressive nor effective. A critical reason for their inefficacy is that the members of the EU are
exempt from the secondary sanctions as stated in the amended PEESA notice of April 2021.
“(6) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN GOVERNMENTS AND GOVERNMENTAL
ENTITIES.-- Sanctions under this section shall not apply with respect to-- (A) the
European Union; (B) the government of Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, or
any member country of the European Union; or (C) any entity of the European Union or a
government described in subparagraph (B) that is not operating as a business enterprise.”
(Peesa as amended 2021).
This clause within the governing notice of the sanction regime toward the Russian pipelines is a
clear indication of the risks that the U.S. as the sender state has weighed against their goals with
the sanction regime.
The pipelines are an element of concern, however, the maintenance of alliances and
restoration of relationships between the U.S. and its European partner states has taken prime
priority over putting itself between Russia and its partners. Keeping the U.S. overarching goal of
curtailing Russian aggression by preventing coercive use of gas pipelines yields causal logic
toward why the implementation of this positive inducement was necessary. With the goal
outlined above the efforts toward stopping and sanctioning the pipelines were a means to an end.
By sanctioning Russian and partner entities involved with the pipelines, the U.S. hoped to limit
their ability to utilize them for the reasons listed. By waiving sanctions on one specific firm the
U.S. was able to gain compulsory support from Germany toward hindering Russia from acting in
ways that would be counter to the overarching goal the U.S. had established. This shows that the
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positive inducement of non-imposed sanctions via the president’s waiver yielded the desired
support from Germany toward achieving the U.S. goals of its overall sanction regime.
With the results proven, this interaction provides evidence toward the first hypothesis of
this study. H1: The higher the economic cost to the partner, the higher the probability that
positive inducements will convince partner states to support the sanction regime. Germany has
invested over 1 billion USD into the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and its expected gains far exceed
that. Turkey also has a substantial economic footprint regarding TurkStream. Even with constant
political pressure from economic allies and other European Partners, both pipelines received
continual backing even during the inception of the sanctions against them. This can be linked to
a causal process that shows the intuition that secondary sanctions could increase this cost and
force compliance does not work regarding this case. The cost is so grand that the U.S. stands to
disturb the balance of relationships with its partner states should it act aggressively. Not only that
but the U.S. market aspect of this case affects the U.S. more than its partners. This is because the
U.S. wants to expand its reach of the energy trade in Europe and as such threatening to punish
via U.S. market limitations would be counter to its interests. The economic cost toward the
partner states is so high that concessions on the part of the U.S. were necessary, as can be seen
with the exemption from sanctions as well as a blatant disregard for sanctionable activity, which
could have been the catalyst to stop pipeline progression. This concession not only demonstrated
a commitment from the U.S. but served German interests in a way that preserved their economic
investment in the pipeline and facilitated a stage from which a joint agreement was established.
In analyzing these occurrences, the cost-benefit analysis of the partner states as well as the
calculus of the sender state both point toward the validation of this hypothesis.
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PARTNER STATE CONSIDERATIONS
Within the scope of this case, both the partner states and individual firms play equal parts
in understanding causal mechanics toward conceding support for the sanction regime. The third
question of this study, “What does the partner state stand to lose from abiding by the overall
sanction regime?” places the question of causal mechanics of compliance on the partner state.
The fourth question "How did firms in the partner state respond to secondary sanctions or
positive inducements?" provides insight into the causal mechanics at the level which directly
affects the pipelines, that of the firms. As such the discussion to follow will display what both
partner states, Germany and Turkey stand to lose through compliance and how the firms
responded, demonstrating that positive inducements were more effective in this case and why.
Addressing the third question of this study, Germany and Turkey are quite converse when
evaluating what each stands to lose if they were to abide by the sanction regime. At the time of
the sanction regime's inception in 2019, both pipelines were already well on their way to
completion. The Nord Stream 2 lagged behind the Turkstream whose completion saw gas flows
begin in 2020. “The pipeline was originally scheduled for completion by the end of 2019. About
2,300 km out of approximately 2,460 km had been laid by December 2019, when Swiss
pipelaying company Allseas suspended activity following the introduction of U.S. sanctions
legislation.” (Wettengel 2021, np). Because of this, a majority of the investment toward the
pipelines was already in place when the sanctions were introduced. This dramatically increased
the stakes for the European partners when faced with the choice to support sanctions or not.
The potential fallout is especially double-sided for Germany. German politicians and
other EU members are divided on the pipeline, therefore regardless of which action Germany
takes they will face substantial backlash. With this being the case the losses from abiding by the
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sanction regime are greater than those for continuing with the pipeline plans. “The EU
Commission has also expressed worries that Nord Stream 2 neither aligns with the energy and
foreign policy interests of many of its member states nor complies with the bloc’s long-term
strategy to achieve an Energy Union. Nord Stream 2 “could impede the development of an open
gas market with price competition and diversified supply to the EU,” the Commission wrote.”
(Wettengel 2021, np). This backlash, which is insinuated at its most aggressive point, does not
compare to the potential loss of the pipelines revenue and economic boosts Germany will gain
from its completion. Abiding by the sanction regime and curtailing the pipeline would cost
Germany not only their investment in the pipeline but also the political ramifications that they
are already suffering for endorsing it would have been for naught. The ramifications of
abandoning the program are also apparent as the Russian foothold on the gas market in Europe
cannot be understated. It will be “painful” for Europe to limit gas from Russia and there may be
more energy shortages,” (Turak 2022, np). When looking at natural gas statistic for the EU this
realization becomes apparent. “Norway was the source of 24.5 % of the natural gas entering the
EU (intra-EU trade and entries from Switzerland both excluded), followed by Russia (23.0 %),
Ukraine (12.8 %) and Belarus (10.3 %)” (Natural Gas Supply Statistics 2021, np). Although this
looks like Russia is not primary there is a major consideration. “However, considering that most
gas entering the EU from Ukraine and Belarus initially comes from Russia, the dependency on
gas imports from this country is in practice higher than on gas from Norway.” (Natural Gas
Supply Statistics 2021, np). The risk of backlash by Russia for German abandonment of the
project puts Germany in a position where the losses they would suffer for abiding by the sanction
regime will translate toward all European partner states. As such compliance via aggressive
sanctions is not the feasible option for the U.S. to pursue.
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Turkish considerations differed slightly from those of Germany because the pipeline had
already been completed. Russia did not miss this opportunity to attempt to publicize the efficacy
of the pipeline and took credit for ensuring that Turkey was “shielded from a gas crisis, which
has gripped Europe, thanks to the Russian-built Turkstream Gas pipeline.” (Soldatkin 2021, np).
If turkey was to abide by the regime at its inception in 2019, it would have lost the gas which
Russia claimed saved it in the first place. This was not a problem for Turkey because the initial
sanction regime excluded a majority of the TurkStream pipelines entities. This implies that the
cost of abiding by the sanction regime was low for Turkey however that is not the case. Scholars
note when it comes to the topic of energy relations Turkey acts in its own best interest and has
resisted the U.S. pressures to limit its energy relations with supplying states (Stein 2017, 12). In
2020 the U.S. updated the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
(CAATSA) to formally include all of the previous exempt TurkStream entities that contributed
to the pipeline’s construction since August of 2017, even though the pipeline was in operation.
“The focus of implementation of Section 232 sanctions would be on persons who the
Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, determines
knowingly, on or after August 2, 2017, (1) made an investment that meets the fair market
value thresholds in Section 232(a) and directly and significantly enhances the ability of
the Russian Federation to construct energy export pipelines, or (2) sells, leases, or
provides to the Russian Federation goods or services that meet the fair market value
thresholds in Section 232(a) and that directly and significantly facilitate the expansion,
construction, or modernization of energy export pipelines by the Russian Federation.”
(Caatsa/CRIEEA 2020, np).
The update to CAATSA raised the cost for turkey as Turkey's goals within the realm of energy
are well documented. "For many years now, Turkey has openly stated its intentions to become an
energy hub and it has taken important steps to achieve this goal.” (Özdemir 2020, 18). CAATSA
and its update altered the calculus of Turkey and even as a NATO member, Turkey still has to
consider the ramifications of their interactions with future pipelines. Even with the
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considerations and U.S. sanctions turkey neither abided by the regime nor supported the sanction
regime. The lack of inducement attempts signifies the glaring absence of a variable that
differentiates the events of the TurkStream from that of the Nord Stream 2. This notable
difference provides insight into how the TurkStream and the sanctions surrounding it further
reinforce the inefficacy of sanctions regarding Russian gas pipelines and the goals of the U.S. to
gain European support against Russian energy coercion.
FIRM CONSIDERATIONS AND OTHER VARIABLES
Within the context of the case of the pipeline, there is a multitude of firms involved. The
importance of firms, in this case, cannot be undermined, not only were positive inducements and
secondary sanctions utilized but, in this case, the partner state and firms were subjected to both.
Because the pipeline was such a large economic undertaking, Russian firm Gazprom could not
manage it alone. As such various European firms were engaged and contributed financing toward
their construction. “Moscow-based, state-owned Gazprom is the project’s sole shareholder and
has committed to providing up to 50 percent of the project’s financing, with the remaining funds
coming from German companies Wintershall and Uniper, Royal Dutch Shell, French ENGIE,
and Austrian oil and gas company OMV. According to Nord Stream 2 AG, the overall costs of
the project will total around 9.5 billion euros.” (Wettengel 2021, np). Although this list contains
various partner state firms it is important to understand that they are not the targeted firms by the
sanction regime. Since they are not engaged in the physical construction of the pipeline, they are
not subject to the secondary sanctions imposed by the U.S. “The companies laying the pipeline
were the Swiss company Allseas and the Italian company Saipem, both of which have suspended
operations due to the US-imposed sanctions. Gazprom will have to complete the pipeline alone.”
(Jacobsen 2021, 1). This occurrence confirms H3 of this study, “Secondary sanctions targeted at
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firms are more likely to yield concessions than those directed at government entities.”. Even
though the firms involved in funding the pipelines were not sanctioned due to the immunity
granted, the firms that that engaged in its construction elected to abide by them almost
immediately.
This occurrence has cascading implications for this study. Firstly, it reinforces the
mechanics behind the sender state decision to omit sanctions toward the firm Nord Stream 2 AG.
Not only was it necessary as the means of an inducement but the U.S. knew that the power to
inflict serious setbacks on the pipelines was within reach. The U.S. elected to instead waive the
sanctions in favor of action that would better suit its overall goals of gaining European support
vice simply causing discontent on its path to those goals. The Secondary sanctions implemented
by DASKA, CAATSA, and PEESA have demonstrated efficacy against firms thus their
implementation against Nord Stream 2 AG, which has been deemed to be the catalyst for the
project, would see U.S.- partner relationships deteriorate. Secondly, it shows that the omittance
of sanctions as a positive inducement was not only for the partner state but must also be viewed
in the context of a positive inducement for that Firm. When viewed within this context it can be
shown that the response to positive inducements by the firm was not anything other than
continuing the work toward completion of the pipeline. Although anti-climactic, it proved to be a
vital step in U.S.-German relations. “German foreign minister Heiko Maas on May 19 said the
US would not impose sanctions against the developer of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline from
Russia to Germany, which he described as a "constructive" step in relations between Washington
and Berlin.” (Elliot 2021, np). Lastly, this action would facilitate the U.S.-German agreement
noted above which gained compulsory German compliance with U.S. sanctions should the
conditions be met. This furthers the U.S. goals toward curbing Russian aggression and protecting
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Europe against coercive energy practices by Russia. The Agreement serves as tangible evidence
validating the first hypothesis of this study.
As with all cases, other variables are inevitable. This study is no different. The major
overt variable in this study is the U.S. interest in the gas market within Europe and relating to
partner states. U.S. actions, as the sender state, took into consideration the partners they were
dealing with and their interrelations. This was not the only major factor considered. The U.S.
wants to stint Russian gas expansion in Europe not only for curtailing their aggression, but also
to expand the U.S. gas market in the region as well. “Advocates of Nord Stream 2 claim U.S.
opposition stems from its wish to sell more of its liquified natural gas to Europe and therefore
sees the deal with Russia as an obstacle to its commercial interests.” (Amaro 2021, np). This
places strings on their actions meaning that an action such as aggressive sanction that would
normally be the U.S. go-to answer may not have been enacted due to second or third-order
effects that would undermine their interests. This was the case with Germany and Turkey
regarding both pipelines. “Turkey has been open to purchasing LNG from the U.S. and its
imports increased from 0.88 percent in 2018 to 2.7 percent in 2019, and 10 percent in 2020”
(Özdemir 2020, 20). The U.S. actions could have potentially been different if they did not have
an interest in the European gas market, as such this variable intervenes in the study as no
allocation is truly made to the sender state biases for sanctions vs positive inducements.
CONCLUSION
The case of the Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream pipeline provide evidence toward the first
hypothesis of this study. As such it validates that the higher the economic cost to the partner, the
higher the probability that positive inducements will convince partner states to support the
sanction regime. In this case, both pipelines are a matter of giving and take with the partner state
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firmly lodged in relations with Russia while also attempting to harbor relations with the U.S. The
sender state recognized that secondary sanctions would put them against major allies and cause
the deterioration of already stressed relationships. Throughout the case, evidence was displayed
reinforcing the inefficacy of secondary sanctions towards both pipelines and the detriment they
can cause to the true goals of the U.S. regarding Russia and energy relations. As such positive
inducements including the omission of sanctions and participation in the Three Seas Initiative
demonstrate the causal mechanics that influenced partner state decision making. Through these,
Germany and the U.S. aligned in an agreement that would see Germany commit to abide by the
sanctions but also supplement them with their own should Russia attempt unsavory actions
regarding energy dependency. Turkey’s situation differs as the pipeline is active however the
considerations remain the same. The U.S. and NATO expect Turkey to maintain its current
position to help if Russia becomes aggressive with Ukraine and as such their exemption of
sanctions and the lesser attention paid to the TurkStream vice the Nord Stream 2 attest to that.
Even so, any future actions by turkey would see the implementation of sanctions continue to
reinforce their lack of ability to yield results within this context. Through the lens of this case,
both secondary sanctions and positive inducements are shown as prolific tools of U.S.
diplomacy. The ever-changing environment and positions of the partner states and their goals
demonstrate the calculus that must be considered when implementing tactics to gain partner
support for a given sanction regime. This case contributes considerations to the above-mentioned
calculus by demonstrating that positive inducements are more effective when economic costs are
higher and that firms directly targeted by secondary sanctions will yield concessions greater than
those of state governments and entities targeted by them.
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CONCLUSION
Within the cases of Iran and Russian pipelines, a certain need for European support to aid
in the success of U.S. sanction regimes is apparent. The cases discussed have presented evidence
toward the efficacy of secondary sanctions over positive inducements and vice versa when
utilized by the U.S. in pursuit of the desired support. Up to this point in the study, the evidence
shown has only demonstrated one side of the argument or the other. Moving forward the
evidence provided will be synthesized via comparison and utilized to create new evidence that
provides key answers to the research question of this study, what circumstances determine
whether secondary sanctions or positive inducements are more effective in gaining European
support for a U.S.-led sanctions regime? Through the continued implementation of the structured
focused comparison method, this discussion will be continued utilizing the five standardized
questions to compare the cases discussed. This discussion will analyze both similarities and
differences between the cases and their outcomes from which an understanding of the
circumstances necessary for European support can be quantified. Figure 2 below provides a brief
comparative synopsis of the two cases framed via the standardized questions.

Table 2: Comparative Synopsis of Case Studies

Methods used
Sender state considerations

Iran Case Study
Secondary Sanctions.

Firm response

U.S. Market dominance, Overall sanction
Regime Goals
U.S. Market Access, Validity as a
sovereign international actor.
Abide by Sanctions.

Overt Variables

Partner state Security concerns.

Partner states stand to lose

Russia Case Study
Secondary sanctions and positive
inducements.
Mend relationship with Germany,
Overall Sanction Regime Goals
U.S. Market Access, investment in
pipeline.
Abide by sanctions.
U.S. investment in European LNG
Market.
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Upon the completion of the comparison and discussion of the two cases, the final section will
seek to provide a guide toward implementing this study's findings to aid policymakers in
determining which tools to use when seeking support for a sanction regime.
METHODS USED AND SENDER STATE CONSIDERATIONS EVALUATED
The methods for gaining support utilized in each case are a cornerstone for this study. In
one case the desired support was gained solely by sanctions while in the other sanctions were
ineffective to that end. The dynamics of each case provide insight into the circumstances which
facilitate their efficacy. Sender state considerations between the two cases is a fitting discussion
to begin the synthesis of this study. Within both cases, a prevalent consideration was the
dominance of the U.S. Market. The U.S. is aware of the economic influence it has across the
globe and as such utilized threats of limiting access to the U.S. market or inflicting punishments
toward the economic sector of partners who do not align with them is an immediate response to
most situations. This knee-jerk reaction to implement sanctions has an impact on the partner
states' calculus. The U.S. understands this aspect and as such implementing sanctions has
become the standard practice. Even so with sanctions imposed in both cases, the sanctions within
the Russia case study were waived from affecting the European partner states. This means that a
major consideration of the U.S. as a sender state in the Russia case was the economic detriment
that could be caused toward their partners by forcing them to choose economically between them
and Russia. This was not the situation in the Iran case. Comparing these considerations from a
U.S. perspective illuminates an aspect of the U.S. calculus that is highlighted in the first two
hypotheses of this study. The calculus essentially places causal mechanics on the economic cost
that the partner state would have to incur. The higher the cost, the more the U.S. needs to offset it
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with inducements to increase the likelihood of compliance, where the lower the cost the threat of
exclusion from the U.S. market is enough of a loss to force compliance.
The second prevailing sender state consideration is what is the goal of the overall
sanction regime and how would their actions toward that goal affect the balance of relationships
toward the partner states. In the Iran case study, although partner states did not agree with the
U.S., they also did not consider their relationship with Iran vital to their affairs. The overall goal
for the U.S. was to force Iran into compliance with its will aggressively, with partner state
support. As noted, the partner states sought to utilize Iran to continue their establishment as a
global entity able to influence the international spectrum autonomously. With the imposition of
U.S. sanctions, the U.S. hedged its bet upon this understanding, and it ultimately paid off. Within
the Russia case, the U.S. knew that shutting down the pipelines was not their overall goal,
however, to Germany the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and its completion were paramount. This
presented the U.S. with an option to demonstrate its commitment to Germany and at the expense
of a concession, which became a positive inducement in the eyes of Germany. Within the U.S.
calculus, the dependency of partner states on Russian gas was at the forefront of concerns, this
dependency limited the ability of the U.S. to use cascading sanctions because of the economic
detriment it would cause across the partner states. Even so, the U.S. needed support from
Germany especially as it would provide leverage against Russia's energy sector and grant the
U.S. direct involvement in the Russian gas trade in Europe. This inducement provided the U.S. a
path forward to the ultimate goal of the sanctions on Russia and as such balanced the costs from
Germany’s perspective.
Within this massive game of diplomatic chess, the U.S. considerations during both cases
hinged on their supremacy within the international economic sphere and their ability to navigate
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their partner state's interests while pursuing their own simultaneously. Through this lens, the
circumstances of sender state considerations that are prevalent in this study and should be among
consideration by policymakers are economic cost to partner states and balancing the partner
state's concerns with those of the U.S.
PREVAILING PARTNER STATE CONSIDERATIONS
Analysis of partner state considerations within both cases yields the most vital discussion
within this study. With the goal of gaining partner support for a sanction regime, both
understanding and affecting their calculus is a key task for policymakers. Within both cases, two
key partner state considerations are identified, that if addressed, could aid policymakers toward
their goals. The first is the diplomatic cost of compliance. The economic cost of compliance for
partner states in the Iran case study was relatively low. As discussed, although the EU was Iran’s
top trading partner it was not reciprocal, Iran was the EU’s 57th highest trading partner
(European Union Trade Balance 2018). With this established the diplomatic ramifications of
compliance took priority. The partner states wanted to establish themselves as sovereign actors
on the international stage, compulsory compliance with the sanction’s regime would have
hindered that aspiration. However, since partner states did comply with the sanction regime, the
catalyst toward that had to be explored. This came in the form of access to the U.S. market. This
economic impact toward the partner states was too grand of a risk in any case regardless of
diplomatic ambitions or economic trade relations. Within the Russia case study, the apparent
disregard for diplomatic considerations on the part of both Germany and Turkey is apparent.
Both actors are economically driven via the cost they have already incurred from their
investments into the pipelines. With the economic cost higher for compliance than that of the
Iran case, the diplomatic rhetoric of Germany and Turkey still played a very minute role in the
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occurrences within both cases. What this demonstrates is that in this case the U.S. gained
compliance notwithstanding the diplomatic goals of the partner state and as such, it is possible to
not consider them as much as other factors when determining which method to use.
The second partner state consideration that endured the test of both cases is access to the
U.S. market. The Iran case is fairly straightforward when describing the economic implications
of losing the U.S. Market regarding partner states. Within the case of Russian pipelines, it is
slightly different. The partner states, mainly Germany, are subject to a difficult position
regardless of the action they take. They stand to lose either access to the lucrative U.S. market by
way of non-compliance, or substantially on their investment in the pipeline via compliance. The
U.S. enacting its form of positive inducement toward Germany altered that calculus making the
loss of the U.S. market more costly than losing the pipelines. Due to the agreement signed, if
Russia had taken unfavorable actions and Germany had stood by them because of its pipeline
investments, their international credibility would have taken a detrimental blow. This implication
coupled with the loss of the U.S. market made the decision for the partner states to commit to
compliance should the situation arise an easy choice. The ability of the U.S. to realize this and
find a way to elevate the value of its market over the competing cost of German investments
provides insight into how important the market is to partner states. As the case stood there was
no guarantee which way Germany would have gone because the costs were so great on either
side their position was unfavorable. The discussion above illuminates that the U.S. can leverage
its dominance over the international economic order as a key influential factor to help gain its
desired support.
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THE ROLE OF FIRMS AND OVERT VARIABLES
With the overarching goal of this study to help increase the tools available to
policymakers in their infinite quest at gaining European partner support, firms provide an
exceptional asset toward that end. Firms were crucial for the role they played within both cases.
In the discussion of Iran, U.S. sanctions against firms engaging with Iran turned the European
Investment bank against its own government, making it extremely difficult for the partner state
governments to carry out their aspirations toward Iran against the will of the U.S. Compliance
with secondary sanctions are much higher from firms than they are from partner state
governments. Table 3 below depicts the firms highlighted in the Iran case as those targeted by
the Secondary sanctions and their responses to them.

Table 3: Partner State Firms Compliance Table (Iran Case)
Firm
European Investment Bank
Total Oil
Allianz
Maersk
Siemens

Complied With Secondary
Sanctions
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

The table serves to show that firms were not willing to risk interaction without exemption from
sanctions via U.S. guarantees. “It would be suicide to do any new business or funding for Iran or
Iran-related companies without explicit guarantees from the U.S. government. They have us by
the throat because so much business is conducted and cleared in dollars,” (Kar and Irish 2018,
np). This sentiment was apparent within the Russia case study as well. The U.S. implementation
of secondary sanctions against Russia had immediate results from the firms within the partner
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states. Table Four below depicts the firms highlighted in the Russia case as those targeted by the
Secondary sanctions and their responses to them.

Table 4: Partner State Firms Compliance Table (Russia Case)
Firm
Allseas
Saipem

Complied With Secondary
Sanctions
Yes
Yes

The compliance of the above firms was critical for the U.S. Both firms were the main
constructors of the pipeline within partner state purview. The U.S. used the track record of firm
compliance as a plan for their move to positively induce Germany via the waiving of sanctions
against the firm Nord Stream 2AG which if implemented, was expected to shut down production
on the pipeline. The ability for a single firm to become the catalyst of an $11 Billion USD
pipeline shows both the importance of firms as well as their exploitation as a critical tool that
policymakers can utilize toward achieving their goals of partner state support. The compliance of
all firms subjected to secondary sanctions across both cases provide evidence to support the third
hypothesis of this study and also places it among the top considerations this study seeks to
provide policymakers.
The overt variables across both cases demonstrate that due diligence must be given to
intervening aspects of any study. Within the Iran case, the security perspective of the partner
states was completely disregarded by the U.S. This factor drove the calculus of the partner states
toward several actions that did not favor the U.S. overall goals. Even so, the evidence provided
demonstrated that the secondary sanctions were effective and gained traction even with this
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political rhetoric. In the Russia case, U.S. self-interests played a factor in the case substantially.
The U.S. is invested in the LNG trade within Europe and as such an underlying goal of their
curtailing of Russian gas, coercion campaign is also to expand their influence over the European
gas market. If this calculation was removed from this case the possibility that it played out
differently would be greater. The overt variables of both cases increased the specific dynamics
that led to the overall outcome of the U.S. gaining the desired support for their sanction regime.
Even with disregarding the partner's security perspective, the economic impact of the U.S.
market was far too great. The calculus of the U.S. made them strive to not only gain partner
support but also to do so in a manner that provided them inroads to further their influence in the
gas market, thus electing to concede a positive inducement to achieve their overall goals.
Although each case had overt variables the conclusions drawn are the same. Some considerations
for policymakers serve as the product of these conclusions and are summarized to follow.
POLICYMAKER CONSIDERATIONS
With the goal of this study to provide insight into the circumstances that make secondary
sanctions or positive inducements a better tool than one another for the sake of gaining partner
support for a sanction’s regime, a fitting product from this study is a series of conditions that
have the potential to increase the efficacy of either tool they utilize. As such this study has
yielded four conditions that, if present, could exploit the circumstances highlighted in the cases
of this study and influence the calculus of partners states in favorable ways.
C1: Partner states value the U.S. market over that of economic ties to the target state.
This condition stems from the logic demonstrating that the partner states do not take the
power of the U.S. market lightly. In both cases, the loss of access to the U.S. market served as a
strong repercussion of noncompliance. When the U.S. open market outweighs the economic
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gains of interacting with the target state, forced compliance via secondary sanctions can proceed
even without diplomatic concurrence, as demonstrated in the Iran case study.
C2: Firms within the partner state have heavy economic involvement in actions
nonfavorable to the U.S.
Secondary sanctions targeting firms have a far higher rate of efficacy than those targeting
government entities. As such, if the target state has considerable partner state firm involvement,
then sanctioning those firms can cease the unfavorable action and severely limit the target state
from conducting unfavorable actions. This is demonstrated through the understanding that if the
U.S. did sanction Nord Stream 2AG it would have stopped the pipeline in its tracks.
C3: Partner States' economic interactions with the target state are substantial and loss of
those interactions would cause comparable damage to loss of access to the U.S. Market.
In the Russia case study, the economic ramifications of backing the U.S. over the pipeline
were detrimental for Germany. They carried a comparable weight to that of ignoring the U.S. and
seeking to continue the pipeline on their own. If this condition is present, it opens the door for
positive inducements to adjust the calculus making it more favorable for the partner state to
support the U.S. than to continue unfavorable actions with the target state. This concession may
not be favorable in the immediate term however it puts policymakers in control of the long game
by conceding with the overall goal in mind.
C4: Government firms are being sought out to pursue the political interests of the partner
states, against those of the U.S.
In the Iran case, the European Investment bank was sought out to conduct transactions
with Iran to attempt to reaffirm the partner's state's commitment to the JCPOA. The EIB refused
to conduct these actions due to the secondary sanctions implemented by the U.S. Through this
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occurrence their existence not only as a firm but also as a government firm designed for a
specific reason such as this, was inhibited by the will of the U.S.
The U.S. and its need for European support is an ongoing occurrence with no end in
sight. The versatility that European support provides, with its influence on over 30% of global
trade, makes their support paramount for any sanction regime. This study has sought to
contribute by uncovering answers to a critical question, what circumstances determine whether
secondary sanctions or positive inducements are more effective in gaining European support for
a U.S.-led sanctions regime? To that end, this study has viewed European support through case
studies and utilized causal analysis to understand the circumstances that facilitate partner state
support. Across this study, the case studies, framework, and overall discussion have led to four
conditions that policymakers of the future may use to implement the will of the U.S. on its
partners. Though these conditions are not absolute, they provide applicability to future cases and
potentially further research that can refine and expand their applicability within international
studies and policymaking alike.
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